Social media. Image by Gerd Altmann on Pixabay

Two universes: unlike on television, in social networks, United Russia and the Communist Party are almost head-to-head

This is the report on the monitoring of social networks from the 5th to the 9th week of the election campaign of deputies to the Russian State Duma (July 20 - August 22), scheduled for September 19, 2021

Elections can be considered free only if conditions have been created for a meaningful public political discussion in which all election participants have an equal scope of rights. Such a discussion can take place in the media, in the form of traditional agitation of candidates, as well as on social networks.

Unfortunately, as the weekly monitoring1 of the federal TV channels shows, the information given by traditional media turns to be strictly censored, leaving little chances for TV audience to generate a knowledgeable opinion about candidates and parties. Representatives of TV channels often justify the misbalance in the coverage of other candidates (preferring, thus, the candidates of the 'party of power') by the fact that other parties do not produce quality news stories.

In order to understand how much the reality of TV channels differs from the reality of the freer space related to social networks, as well as to see how much the citizens are interested in the activities of various political parties, the 'Golos' Movement launched a weekly monitoring. The monitoring began on Tuesday, July 20. The first report is dedicated to a larger period, including the incomplete 5th week of the election campaign, as well as the 6th, 7th, 8th and 8th weeks. Future reports will be published weekly. Below are its key findings.

5th to 9th weeks of the campaign: Conclusions

1) The coverage of the election campaign on social networks is significantly different from what citizens see on the federal TV channels. In fact, we find two totally different realities. In the freer space of social networks, several 'tiers' of political parties have emerged. The highest rank is occupied by United Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) with comparable indicators in terms of the number of posts, mentions, and user engagement. Over the entire monitored period, the two parties accounted for 32.1% and 24.2%, respectively, of all posts related to election participants. The parties of the 'second tier' are the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, New People, and Just Russia – For Truth. These significantly lag behind, however, all of them received more than 5% of the total number of posts with mentions of parties. Next come Yabloko and the Party of Pensioners. All other political parties are hardly noticeable in terms of the number of posts which mention their names.

2) However, the information space of social networks is also distorted due to censored subjects, accounts controlled by traditional media, and pre-moderated large communities. This is especially obvious when analyzing the potential total audience of posts mentioning parties, where United Russia unexpectedly greatly leaps forward. This is achieved thanks to posts about the party in accounts controlled by state or state-controlled media, as well as on public pages with strict pre-moderation, which have already become indistinguishable from the mass media. Thus, in the 8th and 9th weeks of the campaign (from August 9 to August 22), the most 'significant' posts were the posts mentioning United Russia on Youtube from the accounts of NTV2 (13 million subscribers) and Russia 243 (7 million subscribers). United Russia received 9 posts from the channels, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation only 1.

3) The almost simultaneous and massive distribution of identical posts raises questions about the mechanisms of disseminating and paying for such materials. For example, on August 16 alone (the day of parties' placement on the federal ballot), in the pre-moderated Odnoklassniki4 communities we found 2021 identical messages about the 5th place being allocated to United Russia. In addition, a myriad of posts were identified with the variation on this same topic.

4) Despite a huge gap between United Russia and the CPRF in the potential audience of posts mentioning these parties, in terms of user engagement they turn out to be very close to each other. The top 3 places in this indicator are also held by New People, which overtook not only Just Russia - For Truth, but also surpassed the Liberal Democratic Party by 1.5 times. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the other hand, find themselves almost on a par with the Party of Growth and Yabloko. All the remaining parties seriously lag behind. This situation practically does not change from week to week. Only in the period from August 9 to August 22 was there a discrepancy in the level of reactions to posts related to United Russia and the Communist Party. However, it is not as significant as the discrepancy in the other two factors: the number of posts with references and the total audience. At the same time, it is worth noting that although the frequency of mention of the Communist Party remains stable from week to week and the potential audience even decreased last week, the engagement still continues to grow and people continue to discuss the main competitors of United Russia quite a lot.

Mentioning of political parties on social media

The 'Golos' Movement, in its monitoring of election coverage by the federal TV channels, regularly reports5 about the enormous preference of the traditional media when covering the activities of United Russia. By most indicators, including the frequency of mentions, the party is mentioned 1.5-2 times more than all its competitors together.

Just as we expected, the situation on social networks looks different. In the period from the 5th to the 9th week of the election campaign (that is, from July 20 to August 22), 432,430 posts mentioning political parties that nominated their candidates to the elections of the State Duma was identified. During this time, several groups of parties shaped up.

The leader, in terms of mentions for this entire period, was United Russia with its 138,765 posts, that make up to 32.1% of the total number of posts mentioning all parties. However, quite similar indicators are observed for the Communist Party, where we recorded 104,456 posts (24.2%). It was these two parties that ended up in the 'higher tier', representing the two main competitors with comparable rates of mentions on social networks.

Thus, the situation on social networks is significantly different from what can be observed on the federal TV channels, where the predominance of United Russia, in terms of frequency of mentions, is simply enormous. By the way, this very indicator for the Communist Party over the same period lagged behind the 'party of power' by 5 times.

In the 'second tier' there are parties with more than 20,000 mentions over the same period, even though the gaps between them can be quite large. These are LDPR (42,849 posts or 9.9%), New People (29,776 posts or 6.9%) and Just Russia – For Truth (21,519 posts or 5%).

Lagging behind a bit are Yabloko and the Party of Pensioners, showing almost the same indicators: 16,871 and 16,849 posts, respectively. All other parties have fewer mentions.

We note that this allocation of parties has been relatively stable throughout the entire period of monitoring of social networks.

It is worth mentioning that United Russia does not always manage to break away from its main competitor, the Communist Party: on the 5th and 7th weeks of the elections, their mention rates were almost identical. On the 6th week, the gap was by no means significant. The real difference was made by the 6th and 9th weeks. On the 6th week, the site of CEC showed an agreement "on safe elections" initiated by United Russia. The initiative was actively covered by the media, having its reflection on social networks. The 9th week had the drawing of lots related to parties allocation in the bulletin. As a result, social networks were filled with identical messages related to the fact that United Russia occupied the 5th place.

For example, on August 16 alone, we managed to find 2021 identical messages saying the following: 'Election campaign rated 5+: United Russia got the 5th place in the bulletin related to the elections to the State Duma. Russia conducted the allocation of lots in the bulletin of the Fall elections. Position in the bulletin: United Russia got the top five! The number of the party in the electoral lists symbolically coincided with the number of the main candidates from United Russia! More details in the video.' All these messages were posted in different communities of Odnoklassniki. It is noteworthy that in many of these communities, only moderators can publish posts, which makes us assume they were paid for.

We shall note that many 'small' parties have a significant number of mentions associated with the activities of individual candidates. For example, the lion's share of mentions of the Russian Ecological Party 'Greens' throughout the monitoring period was generated by 4 events: the nomination of Sergey Zverev in a single-mandate constituency in Buryatia (this is a rare case when a single-mandate person became the headliner of the entire party campaign); the nomination of a lookalike of the Yabloko candidate Boris Vishnevsky in St. Petersburg; the dismissal of Yabloko's Lev Shlosberg from the elections at the request of Greens' candidate Andrey Pangaev; and an attempt by Greens' candidate Igor Ukraintsev to make the Novosibirsk mayor Anatoly Lokot resign.

For Rodina, the main news stories are also associated with the involvement of 'celebrities,' the singer Tatyana Bulanova and the former football player Dmitry Bulykin, whereas for Green Alternative, the singer Victoria Daineko was engaged.

New People also have their own frontman, the first number on the list, Sardana Avksentieva, who takes a really big place in the campaign. However, it cannot be said that this place is predominant: the share of messages from personal accounts and messages in groups of different regions on a whole range of topics (from business problems to ecology) is very high. At the same time, the dynamics over the past 3 weeks has been progressively upward.

Total audience of posts mentioning parties

The indicator of the potential total audience of posts mentioning parties shows how many subscribers have the accounts or communities that posted such posts. Here the situation is more reminiscent of what we see on federal TV channels: United Russia (2.7 billion subscribers) begins to significantly break away from other parties. For example, the gap from the closest Communist Party (with 1.3 billion subscribers) becomes twofold.

The Liberal Democratic Party and New People were also able to recruit more than 500 million potential total audience during this same period.

These 4 parties are similar to the ones we see both when monitoring the TV channels and when analysing the frequency of mentioning on social networks. However, further on the results become somewhat unusual. The 4th 'parliamentary party', Just Russia – For Truth, falls only to the 7th place by this indicator. It is closely followed by Rodina and the Party of Pensioners. The 5th and 6th places are taken by the Party of Growth and Yabloko.

We see that United Russia has the same peaks attributable to the Communist Party and other parties in terms of the number of posts mentioning parties. The peaks fall on the 6th, 8th and 9th weeks of the election campaign. However, the gap from the second party turns out to be disproportionately great.

This gap is largely created by media accounts, as well as posts in pre-moderated communities. For example, on the 8th and 9th weeks of the campaign (from August 9 to August 22), the most 'important' posts were found on Youtube. They were generated by the accounts of NTV (13 million subscribers) and Russia 24 (7 million subscribers). United Russia received 9 posts from the channels, and the Communist Part just one.

The structure of the most significant posts about United Russia in terms of the size of the potential audience is generally quite indicative. Thus, on the 9th week of the campaign (from August 16 to August 22) 36,731 posts were published mentioning the 'party of power', the potential total audience of which was 636.5 million users. We have highlighted posts from accounts with an audience of over 500k users each. There were only 107 such posts (0.3% of their total number), yet they accounted for almost 1/5 of the audience (18%).

Of these posts, a little more than 1/3 of the audience fell on media accounts. Another 1/3 was in pre-moderated communities, which differ little from the media, as they have a similar editorial policy, related to censoring content. Most of these communities have nothing to do with politics. They contain recipes, congratulations for friends, school jokes, etc. Another 1/3 of the audience falls on personal accounts, which, upon closer examination, also turn out to be either media accounts or professional accounts of politicians, journalists and public figures who differ little from mass media. It is worth mentioning that among the latter, almost 50% of the audience is attributable to the accounts of Alexei Navalny, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Ilya Yashin, who criticize United Russia a lot.

The situation a week earlier is even more indicative. On the 8th week, there were 105 posts mentioning United Russia, generated by accounts with an audience of more than 500k users. They accounted for 1/3 of the entire audience. At the same time, the top ten posts included nine from NTV, Russia 1, and RIA Novosti. One post was from Alexei Navalny. Among these 105 posts, 42% of the audience fell on mass media accounts, 20% on communities and 38% on 'private profiles' among which the largest actually were NTV, Russia 24, Navalny's channels and the TV channel Dozhd6.

Thus, social networks also distort information due to the presence of censored subjects (accounts controlled by mass media and pre-moderated large communities).

Engagement rates for posts mentioning political parties

The engagement rate shows how actively users respond to certain posts. It is a sum of different reactions: likes, dislikes, comments, shares, etc. This is one of the ways to assess whether a post evokes emotions in people, attracts their attention, or whether the message just disappears unnoticed. Therefore, it is considered an important indicator for assessing the quality of promotion on social networks.

It should be noted that the data on the number of reactions to posts is incomplete. A typical post on social media can collect reactions over several days. In our case, the downloading of the reactions was done daily. Therefore, you shouldn't look for absolute data. However, due to the fact that this, albeit imperfect, methodology was applied equally to all parties, the data can be used for comparative analysis.

Several unexpected results appear. Firstly, despite the huge gap in potential audience between United Russia and the Communist Party, in terms of engagement rate these 2 turn out to be very close to each other.

In the top 3 in terms of this rate, there is New People, which overtakes not only Just Russia – For Truth, but also surpasses the Liberal Democratic Party by 1.5 times. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the other hand, find themselves almost on a par with the Party of Growth and Yabloko. All the rest are seriously lagging behind.

This situation is quite similar from week to week. During the period from August 9 to August 22 there was a discrepancy in the level of reactions to posts mentioning United Russia and the Communist Party. However, it is not as significant as in the other two indicators. It is noteworthy that although the frequency of mention of the Communist Party remains stable from week to week (and the potential audience decreased last week), the engagement is still growing, as people continue to discuss the main competitors of United Russia in these elections.

Also noteworthy is the increase in the engagement rate of the Party of Growth, which happened last week. It is associated with an interview given to Ksenia Sobchak by Ksenia Bezuglova, one of the leaders of the federal list of the Party of Growth. As a result, on the 9th week of the elections, the Party of Growth entered the top 4 parties in terms of engagement, having only a small number of mentions (11th place out of 15 parties).

The ratio of engagement rate to the number of posts turns out to be quite indicative: the Party of Growth occupies the first place by large, the second place is taken by another small party, Green Alternative.

However, in the case of these 2 parties (especially, Green Alternative), there is a suspicion that the high indicators are attributable to the fact that these parties are often mentioned not singularly, but together with other, larger and well-known parties.

Next are the Communist Party, New People, and United Russia with very similar indicators. The next group of parties is represented by the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice, Yabloko and Just Russia – For Truth. All the other parties have low average engagement rates.

Methodology

The systems for automatic monitoring of social networks/mass media 'Scan Interfax' and Brand Analytics were used to conduct the research. Monitoring was carried out by the names of parties. In some cases, abbreviated or informal party names were also included (CPRF, 'SRs', 'edinorossy', etc.).

Reports are downloaded daily at 9:00 am. Therefore, the weekly monitoring includes posts published on social networks from 9:00 am of Monday of one week to 9:00 am of Monday of the following week.

Reports for all parties are regularly spot-checked to identify posts that were monitored by mistake. Since the reports on the parties 'Greens', New people, Rodina, and Yabloko initially contained a large number of such erroneous posts, they underwent a full check throughout the entire monitoring period (up to the 8th week) in order to filter out unnecessary posts. For New People, Rodina, and Yabloko, the full check stopped only on the 9th week, when, thanks to fine-tuning of the algorithms, it was possible to reduce the unwanted information to an acceptable level that did not affect the correct determination of the position of parties in relation to the other election participants. Currently, full check of reports is retained for posts mentioning Greens.

Monitoring has been carried out from July 20. Data collection is carried out on social networks (VKontakte7, Odnoklassniki, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, Twitter), blogs, forums, map services, public channels and Telegram chats.

References:

1 See the summary of findings for the first eight weeks of the campaign here.

2 NTV is one of the largest Russian television channels. It is owned by Gazprom Media since 2001.

3 A state-owned Russian news channel.

4 A popular Russian social network used mainly in Russia and the former Soviet Republics.

5 https://www.golosinfo.org/articles/145401

6 The channel is included in the registry of media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent.

7 A popular Russian online social media and social networking service.

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The political bloc of the Moscow Mayor's office has begun campaign preparations for the 2022 municipal elections. Meduza breaks down the key points in the preliminary campaign plan here.

Man working on a computer in the dark. Image by Comstock

Following the observation of the September 19, 2021 elections, the 'Golos' Movement stated that 'the current electronic voting system does not meet the high standards of public accountability of electoral procedures', which the Russian Constitution and legislation establish as mandatory. Despite this position, some promoters of online voting in Russia have been claiming otherwise.

Ufa, Bashkortostan. Photo by Sasha India/flickr

Preliminarily evaluating the elections to the Ufa City Council and the State Duma in the Republic of Bashkortostan, the 'Golos' Movement regretfully cannot recognize the elections as truly fair, i.e., fully compliant with the Constitution, the laws of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Republic of Bashkortostan, and international election standards.

Outside a court hearing. Photo by Vladimir Varfolomeev

The trend of mass dismissal of criminal cases for electoral crimes continues in the first half of 2021, according to findings of the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos'. Penalties for electoral crimes in Russia remain extremely lenient and do not involve real imprisonment.

Krasnodar 2021 election results, by S. Shpilkin

According to the analysis by Sergey Shpilkin, 889 thousand out of 1.7 million votes for United Russia in Kuban do not fall into the normal mathematical distribution. This can result from direct falsifications, pressurized voting of the employees of state-owned enterprises, public institutions, and local authorities, and the use of an administrative resource.

Voters queuing in Sverdlova village of Leningrad Oblast. 'Map of Violations' screenshot

The election campaign in the Leningrad Oblast ended on October 4 with the first meeting of the new convocation of the Oblast Legislative Assembly. Golos' analysis indicates that official election results reflect the undistorted will of voters in only 6 of the 25 districts of the region. Here is an overview of how the seventh convocation of the Leningrad regional parliament was formed.

CPRF rally in Moscow, 2011. Photo by Wikimedia

The Communist Party received 19% of the votes in the last elections to the State Duma. After that, the party's supporters faced unprecedented pressure for the 'systemic opposition.' They were detained, fined, sentenced to administrative arrests, and blocked in the party premises. CPRF continues to challenge the election results and demand an investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Russian State Duma raises retirement age. Image by Wikimedia

On Tuesday, October 12, the new convocation of Russia's State Duma convened for its first session. Roughly a fifth of all lawmakers — 88 of 450 deputies — received their seats from higher-ranked candidates on party lists, winning the jobs because others didn't want them.

Election observation headquarters. Photo by Golos

Statement of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' on inclusion of its members into the Foreign Agents Registry, October 5, 2021.

Map of Violations, Screenshot Oct. 8, 2021

In total, from the beginning of voting dated September 17, 'Map of Violations' by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' published 4592 reports. The Map is a project that collects information about possible electoral violations using the principle of crowdsourcing – observers, voters, members of commissions may report alleged violations witnessed during the electoral campaigning or voting using a submission form on the website or a telephone hotline.

REV-2021. By Nackepelo

The "remote electronic voting" or online voting held in the Russian capital during the September 17-19, 2021 elections was scandalous, to say the least. In response, two groups have been formed by the Russian public to scrutinize the results.

Regions by level of electoral fraud

In order to help assess the outcomes of 2021 State Duma elections, the 'Movement in the Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' provides a reference analysis, dividing Russian regions into six groups based on the level of falsifications in the federal elections of 2016 and 2018 and in the all-Russian voting in 2020.

#Commentary

A scandal in the capital: lengthy vote tabulation, a radical overhaul of the whole election results, and shut down of the observers' node.

"We don't trust Churov - we trust Gauss". Image by Golos

Sergey Shpilkin analyzes data from 96,840 polling stations that cover 107.9 million registered voters out of 109.2 million on the list. His analysis demonstrates that at the polling stations where the results appear genuine, the turnout is on average 38% and the United Russia's share of votes is between 31% and 33%.

Voting. By Photobank Moscow-Live

This is a preliminary statement on findings of observation on the main voting day, September 19, 2021, by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos".' Golos ran long-term and short-term observation of all stages of the campaign. In the course of the elections, the united call center's hotline received 5,943 calls. The 'Map of Violations' received 4,973 reports of alleged violations by noon 20 September, Moscow time, including 3,787 on the voting days.

Voting. Image by Photobank Moscow-Live. CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
Voting. Image by Photobank Moscow-Live

This is a brief overview of election monitoring findings on the Second Voting Day, September 18, 2021 by citizen observers of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"'.

Duma elections. by George Shuklin, CC BY-SA 2.5

This is a brief overview of election monitoring findings on the First Voting Day by citizen observers of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"'.

Campaigning in Samara. 2011 elections. Image by Golos

The September 19, 2021 elections are marked by growing pressure on media and individual journalists, attempts at blocking information about "Smart Voting", and massive coercion of voters to vote and register for e-voting and mobile voting. In parallel, social media has been growing in importance for years as a space of more freedom and an alternative information channel. Here are the main findings of the report that focuses on the impact of these two antipodal trends.

Victor Vasnetsov. Three bogatyrs (Medieval Russian Heroes). Photo by flickr user paukrus

This report covers the monitoring of social networks from the 10th to the 11th week of the election campaign (August 23 to September 5) to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for September 19, 2021.

Russian passports. Image by MediaPhoto.Org, CC-BY-3.0

One aspect of the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections that differentiates them from previous federal elections is the potential participation in the voting process of dozens of thousands of people located on the Ukrainian territories outside of control of the Ukrainian authorities and not recognized as part of Russia by the Russian Federation itself.

Map of Violations Update Sept 6-12. Image by REM

This is the seventh overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' between September 6 and September 12. Since the beginning of the election campaign, 945 messages from 72 regions have been published on the Map.

Poll worker displaying an empty ballot box before the opening of a polling station in Moscow, 18.03.2018. Photo OSCA PA, CC BY-SA 2.0

The de facto impossibility to participate in elections for parties that must register candidates via signature collection turns their existence into a mere formality. This creates a vicious circle in which the system reproduces itself by welcoming only actors that are already 'in' and effectively barring new political players from elections.

Map of Violations Update - Aug 30-Sept 1

This is the sixth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 30 and September 5. In total, from August 30 to September 1, 125 messages have been received by the Map.

Social media. Image by Gerd Altmann on Pixabay

This report covers the monitoring of social networks from the 5th to the 9th week (July 20 - August 22) of the election campaign to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for September 19, 2021.

Vladimir Putin on XVII congress of United Russia in 2017. Image by Wikimedia Commons

Despite its dismal approval rating, Russian President Vladimir Putin's ruling political party can – and likely will – win a constitutional majority in September's legislative elections.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Sept. 1, 2021

This is the fifth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 23 and August 29. In total, 100 messages have been received by the Map during this period.

2019 Rally for right to vote in Moscow. Image by Wikimedia Commons

The Moscow City Court has designated the Anti-Corruption Foundation, Alexey Navalny's Headquarters and the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation as 'extremist' organizations. Inter alia, it implies the prohibition to participate in elections.

The authorities have proceeded to banning pro-opposition candidates from running to the State Duma and other legislative bodies on a pretext of involvement in Navalny's projects.

State Duma elections in Sochi, Dec 4. 2011. Image by flickr/Andrew Amerikov

The elections of the State Duma of Russia of the eighth convocation are marked by considerable tightening of rules for candidate nomination and registration. In fact, the rules are much worse than in 2016, when the current membership of the parliament was elected. Run on the background of harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and information and freedom of assembly and association, the elections are accompanied by a political crackdown against the most active pro-opposition citizens.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 20, 2021

This is the fourth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 16 and August 22. In total, 98 messages have been received by the Map in that period.

Behind a camera. Photo by Bicanski on Pixnio

Equality of rights of candidates in media coverage of their election campaign is one of the most important conditions for holding free and democratic elections. For a significant part of Russians, television remains to be one of the main sources of information. During the election campaign, the influence of television in shaping the attitude of the majority of voters towards elections and candidates is often decisive. Here is a summary of monitoring findings for the five main federal television channels during the first eight weeks of the campaign.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 20, 2021

This is the third overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 9 and August 15. Since the beginning of the election campaign, 452 messages from 62 regions have been published on the Map.

 

Screenshot of Golos' statement cover image

On August 18, the Ministry of Justice of Russia included the Movement 'Golos' as the first unregistered organisation into the registry of unregistered public associations performing the functions of a foreign agent. Here is the translation of their statement.

Russian regional elections in 2018. Image by Wikimedia Commons

According to the CEC data as of 9 July 2021, 4,370 elections and referenda are scheduled for 19 September 2021, including elections to the State Duma, nine gubernatorial elections (new heads will be elected in three more regions), 39 elections to regional parliaments, and 11 elections of representative bodies of regional centres. Here's an overview of legal regulations and peculiarities of these races.

Participants of Just Russia rally take off their uniforms 5 minutes after the start of the Yekaterinburg rally on May 1, 2019. Image by Wikimedia Commons

PART 4: JUST RUSSIA-PATRIOTS-FOR TRUTH

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

A screenshot of a live broadcast of the voting process. Image by 'Golos' Movement.

In 2021, the Russian Central Election Commission decided to scrap open video broadcasts from the polling stations – a feature of Russian elections since 2012. The Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' has appealed to the President to help overturn this decision.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 12, 2021

This is the second overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 2 and August 8.

May 1st, 2009. LDPR Rally. Photo by Photobank Moscow-Live / flickr

PART 3: LDPR

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

The Rt. Hon. Sir Alan Duncan represented the UK at the 23rd OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg, Germany, 8-9 December 2016.
OSCE Flags. Photo by Alex Hammond / FCO. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
#Commentary

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly will not deploy international election observation missions to the 2021 State Duma elections due to major limitations imposed on the institutions. Announcing the decision, ODIHR Director noted that the ability "to independently determine the number of observers necessary for us to observe effectively and credibly is essential to all international observation."

Reporter's notebook. Photo by 2008 Roger H. Goun. CC BY 3.0
#Commentary

On 28 July 2021, the Central Election Commission adopted a new media accreditation procedure that restricts media access to observe and report on the electoral process. The new rules violate the freedom of media editorial policy and may significantly reduce the transparency of the election process.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 5, 2021

This is the first overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between June 22 and August 1.

May 1st Demonstration of the Communist Party, 2012. Photo by Photobank Moscow-Live / flickr

PART 2: CPRF

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

Ballot stuffing, elections March 18, 2018, Lyubertsy. Image - Golos
#Commentary

Less than two months before the elections, the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) decided to scrap open video broadcasts from the polling stations, which have been the feature of Russian elections since 2012.

1st of May Demonstration in Moscow. 2010. Image - Photobank Moscow-Live / flickr

PART 1: United Russia

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

Ballot box for voting on Constitutional Amendments 2020. Photo - Wikimedia Commons

Since the last State Duma elections in 2016, lawmakers have introduced 19 amendments to the election law. In the year leading up to the State Duma elections in September 2021 alone, seven significant legislative amendments have been introduced, six of them in less than four months before the start of the campaign.

TV reporter, Bryansk. Photo - pxfuel

After almost a decade of crackdowns on big players, the landscape of critical journalism in Russia is dominated by local or smaller niche projects. But if the 2020-2021 trend of relentless attacks on media, journalists, and bloggers continues, many of these small projects are not likely to survive into the autumn. The regime makes it pretty clear that it no longer intends to tolerate any dissent.

"1941- ssshhh!" - Image by James Vaughan / flickr

The laws on "foreign agent" and "undesirable organizations" continue to hamper the work of affected organizations, stigmatize and damage their reputation, and isolate the civil society from international cooperation and support. What are these provisions and how are they being applied?

Vladimir Putin Speech at State Duma plenary session 2020-03-10. Image - Wikimedia Commons

The Russian State Duma's seventh convocation is coming to the end of its five-year term. And according to a new report from iStories and Znak.com, dozens of its deputies haven't said a word in a parliamentary session since they were elected in 2016. Others haven't put forward a single bill. Be that as it may, this hasn't stopped these lawmakers from collecting high salaries and planning to put their names on the ballot for the State Duma election coming up in September.

Kaluga. A Holiday. Image - flickr

During the United Russia primaries, experts detected possible falsification of the results and instances of interference in the electronic voting process. According to some analyses, 99% of votes for the first 22 candidates on the United Russia party list were falsified while the amount of falsified votes for candidates in single-mandate constituencies reached 80-95% of the votes cast.

Arrest by the police. Image - Wikimedia Commons

According to election observers, recent amendments further limiting citizens' passive suffrage constitute a "fifth wave" of depriving Russians of their right to stand for election since the collapse of the USSR. New restrictions have a particular impact on politically active citizens.

Programming, computing and information concept. Image - Peshkova, Getty Images Pro

In May, the Russian Federation has tested a new system of remote electronic voting. The Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos" observed the testing phase, took part in the voting, and shared their conclusions and recommendations in a respective report.

"I have the right to choose!" Photo - EPDE.

Opportunities for independent citizen election observation and civil society space in general have been shrinking steadily in Russia over the past decade. Recently, further restrictions have been adopted that limit the ability of citizens to independently monitor electoral processes.

May 1st Demonstration of the Communist Party, 2012. Image by _TMY2892/flickr

Over the past 14 years, the authorities have blocked 120,000 candidates from participating in elections of various levels, depriving millions of Russian citizens of the right to choose their representatives.

A demonstration in Moscow. Image - by Andrey, Pxhere.

Russia has finally outlawed Alexey Navalny's political and anti-corruption movement. Here's how the crackdown affects activists, journalists, and ordinary supporters.

Plenary meeting of the State Duma. Image - Wikimedia Commons
#Commentary

The President of Russia approved the law prohibiting those who are "involved" in the activities of an extremist organization from running in elections.

Electoral headquarters of Alexey Navalny. Photo - Wikimedia Commons

On June 9, the Moscow City Court, based on the charges by the Moscow Prosecutor's Office, recognized the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), the Foundation for the Protection of Citizens' Rights, and the headquarters of Alexei Navalny as extremist organizations. Now, many citizens are under a threat of pressure and persecution.

Vladimir Putin at the United Russia Congress (2011-11-27). Image - Wikimedia Commons

Between May 24 and 30, United Russia held its preliminary selection of candidates for 2021 State Duma elections. Nearly 12 million citizens participated in the party's primaries. Yet, a more careful examination shows an increasingly controlled and non-transparent process, aimed at having the public formally 'endorse' a carefully vetted list of pre-selected candidates.

Meeting of Central Election Commission Chair Ella Pamfilova with OSCE / ODIHR Director Matteo Mecacci. Photo - CEC

Between 2003 and 2018, OSCE/ODIHR published 139 recommendations on how to improve the conduct of elections in Russia. In the run-up to the State Duma elections in 2021, Russia has fully implemented just over 10% of them. Some have been tackled more promptly than others.

Man using computers. Photo by: Lisa Fotios from Pexels

Ahead of the State Duma election on September 19, 2021, Russia just tested its remote electronic voting system. While the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (CEC) is preparing the report about the results of the test, election monitors say Russia's electronic voting system is a black box.

Alexei Navalny. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

The Russian authorities are expected to orchestrate a result in the upcoming State Duma elections that will give United Russia a clear majority of seats. This does not mean, however, that the manipulation of the electoral process by the authorities is complete. In a limited number of competitive districts, true opposition candidates including candidates who are associated with Aleksei Navalny have a real chance of winning if they are allowed to run. In recent weeks, steps have been taken to block these 'undesirable' candidates from participating.

Central Election Commission (CEC) of Russian Federation during April 21, 2021, meeting. Photo by: CEC.
#Commentary

On March 19, 2021, the new composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Russian Federation was revealed. Out of 15 members, eight new people joined the CEC. In particular, the new Commission has been 'reinforced' by bureaucrats from the Presidential Administration, the State Duma, and the Civic Chamber (a consultative civil society institution closely linked to the government).