Online elections in Russia. What to expect from them?

Over the span of several election cycles, e-voting in Russia has proved to be a black box serving the regime’s needs. After its launch in just a handful of regions, it is now expected to become available to all Russians in the 2024 presidential elections to facilitate fraud and deliver an overwhelming vote share for Vladimir Putin.

Russian E-voting System: Basics

Remote electronic voting (DEG in Russian) was first tested in the Moscow Duma elections in 2019 and during the 2020 constitutional plebiscite. Already in September 2021 it was used on a federal level during the parliamentary elections.

From the very moment of its introduction, though, experts and ordinary citizens have expressed numerous concerns about the system's impartiality and warned that e-voting could become an instrument for rigging elections. It still remains unclear how the technology behind DEG actually works and how it could and should be monitored to avoid state interference in the voting process.

There are some good reasons for these worries. To begin with, the Russian remote voting system was developed by Kaspersky Lab - a security software vendor, which is believed to be closely connected to the state. Moreover, DEG operates through the state-controlled and centralized online platform Gosuslugi.ru. All this is likely to allow Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) unobstructed control over the conduct of e-voting. Furthermore, there are no reliable ways for independent observers to verify how electronic ‘ballots’ are counted. Importantly, experts cannot gain access to the system’s raw data, which, essentially, makes it impossible to evaluate the fairness of electoral results.

Not only specialists yet ordinary Russian citizens alike have limited trust in DEG. In 2020, only half of the Russians viewed the new e-voting tool positively. Moreover, 47% of those who had negative attitudes toward DEG were concerned that it would not be used properly but for falsifications, while around 35% were unsure that the system was transparent enough to become an alternative to traditional on-site voting.

In sum, e-voting provides the ruling regime with yet another opportunity to stealthily control the voting process, while the public’s already limited means to prevent electoral fraud may become even more circumscribed. This combination means that remote electron is likely to become an efficient instrument of electoral falsification in Russia, and subsequent election results, unfortunately, are likely to confirm the fears of e-voting critics.

First Test: 2021 Parliamentary Elections

In the run up to the 2021 Duma elections, state-sponsored media were trying to convince undecided and skeptical citizens of DEG’s efficiency, security, and convenience. Notably, even the head of a relatively independent and undoubtfully reputable in opposition-minded circles radio station Echo Moskvy (Echo of Moscow), Aleksei Venedictov, became a key advocate for e-voting. There is no clear evidence, though, whether he had been bribed or whether he was acting out of his own convictions, yet his strong support for DEG might at least partially account for why lots of Muscovites opted for online voting that year.

The actual results from those regions where DEG was available during the parliamentary campaign, however, shocked the public. It was clear to experts in election forensics that the use of DEG dramatically tilted the playing field in favor of pro-Kremlin candidates. In those districts where opposition candidates had realistic chances to win, they eventually lost, while their vote shares in e-voting ‘precincts’ were, unsurprisingly, the lowest. Although quite a few Muscovites were outraged over these results, supposedly fabricated through DEG, and even protested, the CEC, quite predictably, did not notice any violations. Alexei Venediktov, a vigorous DEG supporter, was accused by the opposition of assisting Kremlin in falsifying the election results. He himself, however, never admitted his role in the DEG scandal.

Similar concerns and bursts of outrage characterized the process of e-voting in other places, including unrecognized Donetsk and Lugansk Republics, yet they did not attract much attention due to the long shadow of the Moscow case. Nevertheless, a major takeaway for the Russian authorities was likely to be that the remote voting system could be used for widespread falsification without provoking considerable public outrage.

The System Has Progressed: 2023 Regional and Local Elections

In the most recent Russian elections, conducted in September 2023, remote electronic voting was available in 24 regions (out of 85, including the annexed Ukrainian territories), 18 of which tested this technology for the first time. In line with the previous trend, though, the DEG systematically improved the results of the ruling United Russia party and, most likely, helped further strengthen its electoral monopoly. It is not surprising, therefore, that candidates from the ruling party won in over 90% of the single-member districts.

In addition to the already well-known electoral fraud tactics used in Russia, these most recent elections brought an ‘innovation’: mobilization to vote electronically. Namely, many citizens, mostly state and public sector employees, were compelled and coerced to cast a ‘ballot’ online, as opposed to voting at the polling station. Moreover, in some cases voters who actually came to polling stations and wished to vote on-site were not allowed to do so.

The authorities may be pushing this new type of mobilization due to Russian voters' disbelief in the secrecy of the ballot, which is likely to grow stronger when voting is done online. Simply put, many Russians may be afraid that DEG is not confidential. Accordingly, the authorities may understand that it is already sufficient to just make citizens participate in e-voting: out of fear of being caught, many voters will be likely to give their online-vote for Kremlin candidates even if there is no further control over their electoral behavior. In other words, the Kremlin may have discovered a very cheap yet efficient manipulative strategy.

The Russian public’s mistrust in DEG may have been further reinforced by reports about the system’s multiple failures, including a leak of actual voting data. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that the authorities may contemplate measures to directly monitor e-voting turnout and voters’ behavior online. These could potentially include special QR codes and ‘trap’ websites.

2024 Election: Expectations of Increased Use of Digital Technologies

The continuing spread of DEG shows that the Russian state is eager to adopt new digital technologies and tracking systems. Taking into consideration the presidential administration’s goal to have a 70% turnout in the 2024 presidential election, which it anticipates Putin to win by a landslide, it is fair to assume that e-voting in Russia will be further tailored to the regime’s needs.

Furthermore, the authorities are now considering other digital methods of electoral mobilization. One such option is an app with a geolocation system that will remind people to vote when they pass by their local polling station. Quite likely, this app will only further intimidate Russian voters and will make them even more likely to support the incumbent since one can perceive such reminders as state surveillance.

At the same time, it is likely that the Kremlin will allocate resources on whitewashing efforts to convince the Russians (and the outer world) of DEG’s supposed advantages. In fact, there are already some platforms that explain how the e-voting system works and even solicit reports about potential violations (see, for example, Independent Public Monitoring). A key difference between such projects and independent NGOs, such as Golos, is of course that the former are either sponsored or controlled by the state.

by Aleksandra Rumiantseva, PhD student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill