Russian passports. Image by MediaPhoto.Org, CC-BY-3.0

Residents of Russia-Occupied East Ukrainian Territories Encouraged to Vote in 2021 State Duma Elections

Author: Anton Shekhovtsov

One aspect of the Russian parliamentary elections that are taking place on 17-19 September 2021 that differentiates them from all the previous elections is the potential participation in the voting process of dozens of thousands of people located on the Ukrainian territories outside of the control of the Ukrainian authorities and not recognized as part of Russia by the Russian Federation itself. The territories in question do not include Crimea and Sevastopol, which Russia annexed in March 2014 and since then considers them its own territorial units, but involve what the Ukrainian authorities refer to as 'certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.' Neither Ukraine nor Russia or the larger international community recognizes independence and sovereignty of those areas, but they do consider themselves to be 'Donetsk People's Republic' and 'Lugansk People's Republic', and, for the ease of convenience, we will hereinafter refer to them as 'DPR' and 'LPR'.

The participation in the Russian elections of dozens of thousands of people residing in the 'DPR' and 'LPR' effectively occupied by the Russian Federation became possible due to the executive order1 signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 April 2019. The order established that 'permanent residents from certain districts of Ukraine's Donetsk and Lugansk regions [were] entitled to a fast-track procedure when applying for the Russian Federation citizenship.'

It must be stressed that Putin signed that executive order just a few days after the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as Ukraine's president, and some European officials2 and commentators3 justly noted that the order was both a challenge and a test that Moscow used to hit the newly elected and rather inexperienced Kyiv leadership. The EU expressed4 'its utmost concern' about Putin's executive order. At the same time, Ukraine and Western states declined to recognize the legitimacy of the passports issued to Ukrainians in the 'DPR' and 'LPR'. The situation turned out to be almost identical to that involving Russian passports issued to Ukrainians in annexed Crimea: neither Ukraine nor the Western community recognizes them as legitimate. In order to avoid restrictions, Russian officials would issue Russian passports registered in either Krasnodarskiy Krai or Rostov Oblast, which borders Ukraine, to the residents of Crimea, 'DPR', and 'LPR'.

The number of 'new Russian citizens' in the 'DPR'/'LPR' is difficult to ascertain, and even Russian authorities disagree on the exact numbers. In February 2021, the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior in the Rostov Oblast Oleg Agarkov declared5 that 639 thousand Russian passports had been issued to 'DPR'/'LPR' residents through the fast-track procedure. However, speaking several months later, in July 2021, Viktor Vodolatsky, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots, said6 that the number of 'DPR'/'LPR' residents with Russian passports amounted to 611 thousand. According to the 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities, the number of inhabitants of the 'republics' was7 3.4 million in July 2021.

In 2020, residents of the 'DPR' and 'LPR' already had an experience of participating in a Russian plebiscite. The latter was not an election but the 'all-Russian voting' on amendments to the Russian constitution that took place between 25 June and 1 July 2020. At that time, 230 thousand residents of the 'DPR' and 'LPR' reportedly had8 Russian passports. For those of them willing to vote, 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities would organize special bus services to/from polling stations located in the Rostov Oblast.

However, 'new Russian citizens' were not particularly active in the voting process. For example, out of 112 thousand9 of those 'citizens' in the 'DPR', only 14.5 thousand10 took part in the plebiscite in summer 2020. Several factors contributed to the disproportionately low number of those who participated in the 'all-Russian voting': (1) many 'DPR'/'LPR' residents obtained Russian passports to be able to work in the Russian Federation and were physically absent from the 'DPR'/'LPR' during the plebiscite; (2) the COVID-19 pandemic discouraged many people from long-distance travels; and (3) those willing to take part in the 'all-Russian voting' had to pay for their bus tickets to/from the Rostov Oblast.

In July 2021, Russia's Central Election Committee announced11 that 'DPR'/'LPR' residents holding Russian passports would be able to take part in the Russian parliamentary elections with the help of remote electronic voting (REV). REV was first tested in Russia in 2019. Since then, experts have identified12 several major flaws and weaknesses of the Russian controversial REV system:

  • It was possible to track people's voting behaviour as the private key for decoding the votes was accessible;
  • There were significant differences between the results of the traditional voting and those of REV with regard to candidates supported by the ruling United Russia party;
  • Observers were technically limited in their capacity to monitor potential violations of the integrity of the voting process;
  • Voters' personal data was not sufficiently protected;
  • Voters were able to vote twice or with invalid passports;
  • The blockchain-based voting system used by REV is non-transparent and controlled by the authorities or state-backed companies.

In order to take part in the elections with the help of REV, one needs to have a top-level account registered with Gosuslugi, or the Public Services Portal of the Russian Federation. To register such an account, users need to present passport details and a personal insurance policy number (known by the Russian acronym SNILS) and then verify their identity at a multiservice centre or through a Russian bank online client account. However, 'DPR'/'LPR' holders of Russian passports encountered two significant problems:

  • Holding a Russian passport does not automatically imply obtaining SNILS (SNILS is largely used for pensions payment, and 'DPR'/'LPR' residents are not eligible13 to receive Russian pensions without being officially registered on the territory of the Russian Federation);
  • Verifying an account with Gosuslugi requires having a phone number operated by a Russian company, i.e., a phone number starting with a '+7' calling code.

To solve these problems, Russian authorities, in close cooperation with the puppet regimes in the DPR'/'LPR', implemented the following measures:

  • While collecting their passports at issuing points in the Rostov Oblast, 'new Russian citizens' now simultaneously obtain SNILS and a Gosulugi account;
  • The 'DPR''s mobile provider Phoenix started migration from the Ukrainian +38 calling code to the Russian one (the 'LPR''s Lugacom operator started this migration already in 2019);
  • The procedure of identity verification was simplified for 'new Russian citizens.' In addition to phone numbers issued by Russian mobile operators, they can14 use e-mail accounts registered in the Russian .ru domain zone.

Furthermore, 'DPR'/'LPR' regimes started providing centralized information services on obtaining SNILS by 'new Russian citizens' through special offices: around 141 'Information centres' coordinated by the 'Peace for Lugansk' Social Movement in the 'LPR' and around 255 'Single registration centres' operated by the 'DPR''s 'Ministry of Justice.' In the 'DPR', holders of Russian passports can also obtain SNILS at human resources offices at their places of work or military service, migration departments, and public reception offices of the 'Donetsk Republic' organization. They can also receive information on SNILS through the so-called 'Information Centre 357': they need to call a short number 357 from a number registered with the Phoenix mobile provider.

While the 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities are in charge of organizing 'information services' on obtaining SNILS locally, from the Russian side, the entire process is reportedly supervised by Viktor Vodolatsky.

By the beginning of August 2021, according to the 'DPR'/'LPR' authorities, 148 thousand15 'new Russian citizens' obtained SNILS in the 'DPR', and 158 thousand16 – in the 'LPR'. This means that around 9% of the entire population of the 'DPR'/'LPR' have Russian personal insurance policy numbers. Still, it does not mean that all of them (1) successfully registered with Gosuslugi and (2) will eventually vote. According to different estimates17,18, around 100-150 thousand holders of Russian passports located in the 'DPR'/'LPR' are eligible to take part in the Russian parliamentary elections through REV, but the number of actual electronic voters is likely to be lower than 100 thousand.

In addition to REV system, some 'new Russian citizens' of the 'DPR'/'LPR' will also be taken by buses and trains to the Rostov Oblast, where they will be able to cast their votes at 16 polling stations19 established specifically for them. It is expected that around 18-20 thousand people can be transported to the Rostov Oblast to take part in the elections physically.

In an attempt to avoid additional Western sanctions against the Russian Federation, there will be no polling stations on the territories controlled by the 'DPR'/'LPR' regimes, but the authorities have established so-called 'information centres'20 where consultants will help eligible voters cast their vote through REV.

'New Russian citizens' will only be able to cast their votes for federal party lists, but they will be unable to vote for candidates in single-member districts as Russia does not officially recognize the 'DPR'/'LPR' as its own territorial units. Experts have little doubts21 that – among 'DPR'/'LPR' voters – the ruling United Russia party will score significantly better than any other Russian party allowed to run in the parliamentary elections. Moreover, it is viable to predict that United Russia will receive substantively more votes from 'new Russian citizens' than in Russia on average. The major reason for the overwhelming support for United Russia in the 'DPR'/'LPR' is the conviction22 that only Russia can solve existential problems of the 'DPR'/'LPR', so by showing loyalty to the Russian ruling party, 'new Russian citizens' of the occupied territories believe to be investing in their own future. It must be stressed here, however, that only a tiny minority of the population of the 'DPR'/'LPR', around 3%, are likely to take part in the Russian elections.

Ukraine's Foreign Ministry expectedly expressed its 'resolute protest'23 over Russia's decision to engage 'DPR'/'LPR' residents in the Russian parliamentary elections calling the corresponding developments in occupied territories of eastern Ukraine, as well as in annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, 'a flagrant violation of norms and principles of international law, the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian legislation in force.' Ukraine also called on the international community to condemn Russia's actions and not to recognize the results of the election in the Russia-occupied and annexed Ukrainian territories.

References
Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos'. By Photobank Moscow-Live
#Commentary

Since September 2021, twenty regional coordinators and experts of the 'Golos' Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights were added to the registry of foreign media outlets performing the functions of 'a foreign agent'. Here's an overview of how election observers are being targeted and persecuted.

Plenary chamber of the Council of Europe's Palace of Europe. Image by PPCOE
#Commentary

Independent election experts have described the 2021 Duma elections as the dirtiest elections in Russia's history. The lack of public control, the deprivation of millions of Russian citizens of their passive suffrage, massive manipulation of results through e-voting, holding of elections on the annexed territory of Crimea, and the inclusion of voters from the occupied Eastern Ukraine put the legitimacy of the current State Duma and the new PACE delegation under question.

Detained Anti-corruption Foundation and Newcaster.TV staff, 2017. Photo by Ruslan Leviev

The passing year built on legislative trends of the previous one and even brought about many innovations in censorship, limitations of online activities, and infringements on privacy. Such provisions include multiple prohibitions related to the Great Patriotic War, the ‘law against Anti-Corruption Foundation’, and infamous QR codes.

Policemen block a street in Moscow. Photo by Sergey Korneev

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Rally for the right to vote in Moscow (2019-07-27). Photo by Ilya Varlamov

OVD-Info's statement on the liquidation of its partner - the 'Memorial' Human Rights Center.

Navalny's Election Headquarters. Image by Dmitry Rozhkov

Hardly any of Navalny's key allies currently remain in Russia. The Insider interviewed former coordinators of Navalny's regional headquarters to find out why and how they left, what they do in exile, and under what conditions they are willing to return to Russia.

Basmanny District Court. Image by Photobank Moscow Live

On December 8, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow ruled to liquidate the 'League of Voters' Foundation. Its leaders believe that the ruling is politically motivated and is aimed to destroy the organization which is a partner in the 'Golos' Movement and supports the training of independent citizen election observers in Russia.

State Duma. Image by Moscow Live/flickr

OVD-Info reviews the newly expanded 'foreign agents' law to identify and analyze discriminatory aspects of the legislation and its application.

2019 Moscow City Duma election. Image by Krassotkin

A member of the 'Golos' Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights recounts their experience observing elections on behalf of the Moscow Civic Chamber. According to the activist, the institution appears to purposefully instruct observers in such a manner as to limit their ability to make a real difference at the polling stations.

Russian coach at Helsinki Central Railway Station. Image by Antti Leppänen

Last year United Russia collected a record amount of donations from legal entities, 4.8 billion rubles. The Insider learned that the party received about half of this money from major Russian Railways contractors, some of which seemingly could not afford to make such "donations". Despite claiming to channel funds towards charity and fighting the Coronavirus, the party spent it on the maintenance of its apparatus and election campaigning.

Russian flag with gloomy clouds. Image by Pxhere

Russian authorities have moved to liquidate the International Historical Educational Charitable and Human Rights Society 'Memorial' and its affiliate, Russian Human Rights Centre 'Memorial'. The 'Golos' Movement calls for solidarity with Russia's longest-standing human rights organization.

Moscow, the Kremlin and Red Square. Photo by Vyacheslav Argenberg

The political bloc of the Moscow Mayor's office has begun campaign preparations for the 2022 municipal elections. Meduza breaks down the key points in the preliminary campaign plan here.

Man working on a computer in the dark. Image by Comstock

Following the observation of the September 19, 2021 elections, the 'Golos' Movement stated that 'the current electronic voting system does not meet the high standards of public accountability of electoral procedures', which the Russian Constitution and legislation establish as mandatory. Despite this position, some promoters of online voting in Russia have been claiming otherwise.

Ufa, Bashkortostan. Photo by Sasha India/flickr

Preliminarily evaluating the elections to the Ufa City Council and the State Duma in the Republic of Bashkortostan, the 'Golos' Movement regretfully cannot recognize the elections as truly fair, i.e., fully compliant with the Constitution, the laws of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Republic of Bashkortostan, and international election standards.

Outside a court hearing. Photo by Vladimir Varfolomeev

The trend of mass dismissal of criminal cases for electoral crimes continues in the first half of 2021, according to findings of the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos'. Penalties for electoral crimes in Russia remain extremely lenient and do not involve real imprisonment.

Krasnodar 2021 election results, by S. Shpilkin

According to the analysis by Sergey Shpilkin, 889 thousand out of 1.7 million votes for United Russia in Kuban do not fall into the normal mathematical distribution. This can result from direct falsifications, pressurized voting of the employees of state-owned enterprises, public institutions, and local authorities, and the use of an administrative resource.

Voters queuing in Sverdlova village of Leningrad Oblast. 'Map of Violations' screenshot

The election campaign in the Leningrad Oblast ended on October 4 with the first meeting of the new convocation of the Oblast Legislative Assembly. Golos' analysis indicates that official election results reflect the undistorted will of voters in only 6 of the 25 districts of the region. Here is an overview of how the seventh convocation of the Leningrad regional parliament was formed.

CPRF rally in Moscow, 2011. Photo by Wikimedia

The Communist Party received 19% of the votes in the last elections to the State Duma. After that, the party's supporters faced unprecedented pressure for the 'systemic opposition.' They were detained, fined, sentenced to administrative arrests, and blocked in the party premises. CPRF continues to challenge the election results and demand an investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Russian State Duma raises retirement age. Image by Wikimedia

On Tuesday, October 12, the new convocation of Russia's State Duma convened for its first session. Roughly a fifth of all lawmakers — 88 of 450 deputies — received their seats from higher-ranked candidates on party lists, winning the jobs because others didn't want them.

Election observation headquarters. Photo by Golos

Statement of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' on inclusion of its members into the Foreign Agents Registry, October 5, 2021.

Map of Violations, Screenshot Oct. 8, 2021

In total, from the beginning of voting dated September 17, 'Map of Violations' by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' published 4592 reports. The Map is a project that collects information about possible electoral violations using the principle of crowdsourcing – observers, voters, members of commissions may report alleged violations witnessed during the electoral campaigning or voting using a submission form on the website or a telephone hotline.

REV-2021. By Nackepelo

The "remote electronic voting" or online voting held in the Russian capital during the September 17-19, 2021 elections was scandalous, to say the least. In response, two groups have been formed by the Russian public to scrutinize the results.

Regions by level of electoral fraud

In order to help assess the outcomes of 2021 State Duma elections, the 'Movement in the Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' provides a reference analysis, dividing Russian regions into six groups based on the level of falsifications in the federal elections of 2016 and 2018 and in the all-Russian voting in 2020.

#Commentary

A scandal in the capital: lengthy vote tabulation, a radical overhaul of the whole election results, and shut down of the observers' node.

"We don't trust Churov - we trust Gauss". Image by Golos

Sergey Shpilkin analyzes data from 96,840 polling stations that cover 107.9 million registered voters out of 109.2 million on the list. His analysis demonstrates that at the polling stations where the results appear genuine, the turnout is on average 38% and the United Russia's share of votes is between 31% and 33%.

Voting. By Photobank Moscow-Live

This is a preliminary statement on findings of observation on the main voting day, September 19, 2021, by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos".' Golos ran long-term and short-term observation of all stages of the campaign. In the course of the elections, the united call center's hotline received 5,943 calls. The 'Map of Violations' received 4,973 reports of alleged violations by noon 20 September, Moscow time, including 3,787 on the voting days.

Voting. Image by Photobank Moscow-Live. CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
Voting. Image by Photobank Moscow-Live

This is a brief overview of election monitoring findings on the Second Voting Day, September 18, 2021 by citizen observers of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"'.

Duma elections. by George Shuklin, CC BY-SA 2.5

This is a brief overview of election monitoring findings on the First Voting Day by citizen observers of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"'.

Campaigning in Samara. 2011 elections. Image by Golos

The September 19, 2021 elections are marked by growing pressure on media and individual journalists, attempts at blocking information about "Smart Voting", and massive coercion of voters to vote and register for e-voting and mobile voting. In parallel, social media has been growing in importance for years as a space of more freedom and an alternative information channel. Here are the main findings of the report that focuses on the impact of these two antipodal trends.

Victor Vasnetsov. Three bogatyrs (Medieval Russian Heroes). Photo by flickr user paukrus

This report covers the monitoring of social networks from the 10th to the 11th week of the election campaign (August 23 to September 5) to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for September 19, 2021.

Russian passports. Image by MediaPhoto.Org, CC-BY-3.0

One aspect of the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections that differentiates them from previous federal elections is the potential participation in the voting process of dozens of thousands of people located on the Ukrainian territories outside of control of the Ukrainian authorities and not recognized as part of Russia by the Russian Federation itself.

Map of Violations Update Sept 6-12. Image by REM

This is the seventh overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' between September 6 and September 12. Since the beginning of the election campaign, 945 messages from 72 regions have been published on the Map.

Poll worker displaying an empty ballot box before the opening of a polling station in Moscow, 18.03.2018. Photo OSCA PA, CC BY-SA 2.0

The de facto impossibility to participate in elections for parties that must register candidates via signature collection turns their existence into a mere formality. This creates a vicious circle in which the system reproduces itself by welcoming only actors that are already 'in' and effectively barring new political players from elections.

Map of Violations Update - Aug 30-Sept 1

This is the sixth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 30 and September 5. In total, from August 30 to September 1, 125 messages have been received by the Map.

Social media. Image by Gerd Altmann on Pixabay

This report covers the monitoring of social networks from the 5th to the 9th week (July 20 - August 22) of the election campaign to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for September 19, 2021.

Vladimir Putin on XVII congress of United Russia in 2017. Image by Wikimedia Commons

Despite its dismal approval rating, Russian President Vladimir Putin's ruling political party can – and likely will – win a constitutional majority in September's legislative elections.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Sept. 1, 2021

This is the fifth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 23 and August 29. In total, 100 messages have been received by the Map during this period.

2019 Rally for right to vote in Moscow. Image by Wikimedia Commons

The Moscow City Court has designated the Anti-Corruption Foundation, Alexey Navalny's Headquarters and the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation as 'extremist' organizations. Inter alia, it implies the prohibition to participate in elections.

The authorities have proceeded to banning pro-opposition candidates from running to the State Duma and other legislative bodies on a pretext of involvement in Navalny's projects.

State Duma elections in Sochi, Dec 4. 2011. Image by flickr/Andrew Amerikov

The elections of the State Duma of Russia of the eighth convocation are marked by considerable tightening of rules for candidate nomination and registration. In fact, the rules are much worse than in 2016, when the current membership of the parliament was elected. Run on the background of harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and information and freedom of assembly and association, the elections are accompanied by a political crackdown against the most active pro-opposition citizens.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 20, 2021

This is the fourth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 16 and August 22. In total, 98 messages have been received by the Map in that period.

Behind a camera. Photo by Bicanski on Pixnio

Equality of rights of candidates in media coverage of their election campaign is one of the most important conditions for holding free and democratic elections. For a significant part of Russians, television remains to be one of the main sources of information. During the election campaign, the influence of television in shaping the attitude of the majority of voters towards elections and candidates is often decisive. Here is a summary of monitoring findings for the five main federal television channels during the first eight weeks of the campaign.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 20, 2021

This is the third overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 9 and August 15. Since the beginning of the election campaign, 452 messages from 62 regions have been published on the Map.

 

Screenshot of Golos' statement cover image

On August 18, the Ministry of Justice of Russia included the Movement 'Golos' as the first unregistered organisation into the registry of unregistered public associations performing the functions of a foreign agent. Here is the translation of their statement.

Russian regional elections in 2018. Image by Wikimedia Commons

According to the CEC data as of 9 July 2021, 4,370 elections and referenda are scheduled for 19 September 2021, including elections to the State Duma, nine gubernatorial elections (new heads will be elected in three more regions), 39 elections to regional parliaments, and 11 elections of representative bodies of regional centres. Here's an overview of legal regulations and peculiarities of these races.

Participants of Just Russia rally take off their uniforms 5 minutes after the start of the Yekaterinburg rally on May 1, 2019. Image by Wikimedia Commons

PART 4: JUST RUSSIA-PATRIOTS-FOR TRUTH

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

A screenshot of a live broadcast of the voting process. Image by 'Golos' Movement.

In 2021, the Russian Central Election Commission decided to scrap open video broadcasts from the polling stations – a feature of Russian elections since 2012. The Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' has appealed to the President to help overturn this decision.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 12, 2021

This is the second overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 2 and August 8.

May 1st, 2009. LDPR Rally. Photo by Photobank Moscow-Live / flickr

PART 3: LDPR

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

The Rt. Hon. Sir Alan Duncan represented the UK at the 23rd OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg, Germany, 8-9 December 2016.
OSCE Flags. Photo by Alex Hammond / FCO. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
#Commentary

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly will not deploy international election observation missions to the 2021 State Duma elections due to major limitations imposed on the institutions. Announcing the decision, ODIHR Director noted that the ability "to independently determine the number of observers necessary for us to observe effectively and credibly is essential to all international observation."

Reporter's notebook. Photo by 2008 Roger H. Goun. CC BY 3.0
#Commentary

On 28 July 2021, the Central Election Commission adopted a new media accreditation procedure that restricts media access to observe and report on the electoral process. The new rules violate the freedom of media editorial policy and may significantly reduce the transparency of the election process.

Map of Violations, Golos website. Screenshot - Aug. 5, 2021

This is the first overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between June 22 and August 1.

May 1st Demonstration of the Communist Party, 2012. Photo by Photobank Moscow-Live / flickr

PART 2: CPRF

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

Ballot stuffing, elections March 18, 2018, Lyubertsy. Image - Golos
#Commentary

Less than two months before the elections, the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) decided to scrap open video broadcasts from the polling stations, which have been the feature of Russian elections since 2012.

1st of May Demonstration in Moscow. 2010. Image - Photobank Moscow-Live / flickr

PART 1: United Russia

According to sociologists, the same four parties represented in the parliament now: United Russia, the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and Just Russia will probably be elected again in 2021. How are these four parties organized? What is their support base in regions?

Ballot box for voting on Constitutional Amendments 2020. Photo - Wikimedia Commons

Since the last State Duma elections in 2016, lawmakers have introduced 19 amendments to the election law. In the year leading up to the State Duma elections in September 2021 alone, seven significant legislative amendments have been introduced, six of them in less than four months before the start of the campaign.

TV reporter, Bryansk. Photo - pxfuel

After almost a decade of crackdowns on big players, the landscape of critical journalism in Russia is dominated by local or smaller niche projects. But if the 2020-2021 trend of relentless attacks on media, journalists, and bloggers continues, many of these small projects are not likely to survive into the autumn. The regime makes it pretty clear that it no longer intends to tolerate any dissent.

"1941- ssshhh!" - Image by James Vaughan / flickr

The laws on "foreign agent" and "undesirable organizations" continue to hamper the work of affected organizations, stigmatize and damage their reputation, and isolate the civil society from international cooperation and support. What are these provisions and how are they being applied?

Vladimir Putin Speech at State Duma plenary session 2020-03-10. Image - Wikimedia Commons

The Russian State Duma's seventh convocation is coming to the end of its five-year term. And according to a new report from iStories and Znak.com, dozens of its deputies haven't said a word in a parliamentary session since they were elected in 2016. Others haven't put forward a single bill. Be that as it may, this hasn't stopped these lawmakers from collecting high salaries and planning to put their names on the ballot for the State Duma election coming up in September.

Kaluga. A Holiday. Image - flickr

During the United Russia primaries, experts detected possible falsification of the results and instances of interference in the electronic voting process. According to some analyses, 99% of votes for the first 22 candidates on the United Russia party list were falsified while the amount of falsified votes for candidates in single-mandate constituencies reached 80-95% of the votes cast.

Arrest by the police. Image - Wikimedia Commons

According to election observers, recent amendments further limiting citizens' passive suffrage constitute a "fifth wave" of depriving Russians of their right to stand for election since the collapse of the USSR. New restrictions have a particular impact on politically active citizens.

Programming, computing and information concept. Image - Peshkova, Getty Images Pro

In May, the Russian Federation has tested a new system of remote electronic voting. The Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos" observed the testing phase, took part in the voting, and shared their conclusions and recommendations in a respective report.

"I have the right to choose!" Photo - EPDE.

Opportunities for independent citizen election observation and civil society space in general have been shrinking steadily in Russia over the past decade. Recently, further restrictions have been adopted that limit the ability of citizens to independently monitor electoral processes.

May 1st Demonstration of the Communist Party, 2012. Image by _TMY2892/flickr

Over the past 14 years, the authorities have blocked 120,000 candidates from participating in elections of various levels, depriving millions of Russian citizens of the right to choose their representatives.

A demonstration in Moscow. Image - by Andrey, Pxhere.

Russia has finally outlawed Alexey Navalny's political and anti-corruption movement. Here's how the crackdown affects activists, journalists, and ordinary supporters.

Plenary meeting of the State Duma. Image - Wikimedia Commons
#Commentary

The President of Russia approved the law prohibiting those who are "involved" in the activities of an extremist organization from running in elections.

Electoral headquarters of Alexey Navalny. Photo - Wikimedia Commons

On June 9, the Moscow City Court, based on the charges by the Moscow Prosecutor's Office, recognized the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), the Foundation for the Protection of Citizens' Rights, and the headquarters of Alexei Navalny as extremist organizations. Now, many citizens are under a threat of pressure and persecution.

Vladimir Putin at the United Russia Congress (2011-11-27). Image - Wikimedia Commons

Between May 24 and 30, United Russia held its preliminary selection of candidates for 2021 State Duma elections. Nearly 12 million citizens participated in the party's primaries. Yet, a more careful examination shows an increasingly controlled and non-transparent process, aimed at having the public formally 'endorse' a carefully vetted list of pre-selected candidates.

Meeting of Central Election Commission Chair Ella Pamfilova with OSCE / ODIHR Director Matteo Mecacci. Photo - CEC

Between 2003 and 2018, OSCE/ODIHR published 139 recommendations on how to improve the conduct of elections in Russia. In the run-up to the State Duma elections in 2021, Russia has fully implemented just over 10% of them. Some have been tackled more promptly than others.

Man using computers. Photo by: Lisa Fotios from Pexels

Ahead of the State Duma election on September 19, 2021, Russia just tested its remote electronic voting system. While the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (CEC) is preparing the report about the results of the test, election monitors say Russia's electronic voting system is a black box.

Alexei Navalny. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

The Russian authorities are expected to orchestrate a result in the upcoming State Duma elections that will give United Russia a clear majority of seats. This does not mean, however, that the manipulation of the electoral process by the authorities is complete. In a limited number of competitive districts, true opposition candidates including candidates who are associated with Aleksei Navalny have a real chance of winning if they are allowed to run. In recent weeks, steps have been taken to block these 'undesirable' candidates from participating.

Central Election Commission (CEC) of Russian Federation during April 21, 2021, meeting. Photo by: CEC.
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On March 19, 2021, the new composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Russian Federation was revealed. Out of 15 members, eight new people joined the CEC. In particular, the new Commission has been 'reinforced' by bureaucrats from the Presidential Administration, the State Duma, and the Civic Chamber (a consultative civil society institution closely linked to the government).