The Russian law governing the country's polity is undergoing changes this very moment. The purpose of these changes is not political reform but consolidation of the existing political system. It is like being on a treadmill: running to stay in the same place.
The changes include two laws introduced into the Russian parliament by Senator Andrey Klishas and State Duma deputy Pavel Krasheninnikov (each in his respective chamber is responsible for getting the Kremlin's political ideas through the legislature). The 300-page law 'On the General Principles of the Organization of Public Authority in the Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation' came into effect on December 21, 2021. The law directly associated with it, namely the law 'On the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government under the Unified System of Public Authority' was introduced on December 16 and is still in its first reading.
Both laws build on the constitutional amendment regarding a unified system of public authority, which now includes all bodies of state power at the federal, regional and local levels (i.e. providing legal grounds for the de facto elimination of independent local self-government authorities). The essence of the 'unified system of public authority' is most succinctly formulated in the former law (Article 2): 'The President of the Russian Federation shall ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of the bodies that make up the unified system of public authority'.
This amendment could be deemed 'protective' because it seeks to further enshrine the so-called 'power vertical' that the Kremlin has been constructing since the early 2000s.
The new laws ensure the federal centre almost limitless scope to interfere in the affairs of the regions, and for regional authorities to interfere in the affairs of municipalities. For example, it is stipulated that federal authorities can influence regional staffing decisions in the areas of education, healthcare, finance, construction, real estate, and state regulation of tariffs, while the president can override any decision of the governor. At the same time, regional authorities can take away the most important powers from municipalities.
Each of these laws deserves its own series of articles analyzing their possible implications. This piece will focus only on how they will affect the electoral sphere. On December 16, United Russia's deputies Dmitry Vyatkin and Dmitry Lameikin submitted to the State Duma a draft law on remote electronic voting, which also affects the electoral sphere and thus, indirectly, Russia's polity. We will therefore include it in this review as well.
A blow to the party system
The Russian party system has gone through two major phases of development over the past twenty years.
In the 2000s, the Kremlin set itself the goal of maximally unifying the country — building a 'power vertical' — and began to engage combatively with independent regional and local politicians. The result was not only the doing away with direct gubernatorial elections in 2005 and the expulsion of governors and heads of regional parliaments from the Federation Council, but also the introduction of pure proportional representation in the Russian State Duma — single-member constituencies ceased to exist at the federal level. All this was acclaimed by pro-government commentators, who emphasized the need to strengthen political parties. It seems that some of them were quite frank in expressing the belief that the parties that should constitute the backbone of any modern political system in Russia were those born of the 1990s as clubs of diverse politicians who were not united by common views. The nature of the parties has not changed.
After the 2011 election, the Russian authorities faced a new reality — a decline in the ratings of the 'party of power'. In order to keep its dominant position, a U-turn was made — in the State Duma elections, single-member constituencies were re-introduced (it is through them that United Russia gets a constitutional majority in the parliament, despite the party's much more modest level of support). In the regional and local legislatures, the proportion of seats allocated by party lists gradually decreased and the proportion of candidates in single-seat constituencies increased.
A new law passed in December 2021 sees regional elections depart from proportional representation in favour of a first-past-the-post majoritarian system. This will have several consequences.
First, the majoritarian system significantly distorts representation. The leading party has a chance of winning 100% of the seats, even if its level of support is 30−35%. However, given United Russia's moderate popularity ratings, the party risks losing more than it can gain. One of the most telling examples is that of the 2019 Khabarovsk Krai Duma elections, when, following Sergei Furgal's victory in the gubernatorial race, United Russia (which had a majority in the Krai Duma at the time) cut the proportional part of the legislative assembly but still ended up losing all single-member constituencies and winning only two seats from the candidate list.
Second — and more importantly — it will become much more difficult for parties to obtain the so-called parliamentary privilege, i.e. the right to nominate candidates without collecting signatures. When it was almost impossible for candidates to register by collecting signatures, it was this privilege that attracted many of them to the parties. Now the importance of parties will be reduced at all levels — federal, regional and local. For example, in order to enjoy this privilege and nominate candidates to the Duma, a party must have won more than three percent of the vote in the previous election, or get mandates on a list in at least one regional parliament. In the 2021 elections, 14 parties had the advantage (in the end, only they made it to the ballot). Of these, four parties were represented in the federal parliament and the rest received the privilege through regional elections.
At present, only 11 parties are eligible to compete in the next Duma election: five parliamentary parties (United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], A Just Russia — For Truth, and 'New People') and six parties which formed their factions in regional assemblies this September (Party of Pensioners, Communists of Russia, Yabloko, Rodina, the Greens, and the Party of the Direct Democracy). Of those parties that ran in the 2021 elections, the privilege has not yet been extended to the Party of Growth, Green Alternative, Civic Platform or the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice — they need to get at least five percent of the list in one region, but this may become impossible if there are no more lists. As a result, politicians will have fewer opportunities to run for office without collecting signatures — there will be fewer ways in to this market.
This will affect regional and local elections even more, as there are fewer parties enjoying privileges at this level: these are the five federal parliamentary parties plus the parties that won more than three percent in the regional elections. According to the results of the September 17−19 elections, in 32 out of 39 regions where regional parliamentary elections were held, between six and eight parties are entitled to nominate candidates without having to collect signatures in local and regional elections. And in most regions this number has increased significantly compared to the previous parliamentary cycle. But where list-based elections are eliminated, no one will have any privileges a few years from now — many opposition politicians will simply find it impossible to register for elections.
It is noteworthy that the elimination of the mandatory proportional component in regional elections looks like a direct reaction by the authorities to the failed regional elections of September 2021, as this provision appeared only in the second version of the law, in November to December: it did not feature in the original bill.
In this way, the Kremlin is trying to protect elections from potentially problematic candidates. 'Undesirable' candidates who do slip through the registration filter face another challenge that has been emerging in recent years and is now being legislated, namely remote electronic voting (REV). Tests of the system have already caused scandals, as test results at digital polling stations differ significantly from those at regular polling stations. Russian election organizers have persisted in introducing REV without fully guaranteeing voting rights. Observers and experts believe that pushing REV forward in this way may indicate preparations for mass fraud and other electoral manipulation. The new legal provisions regulating online voting are worded in a way that provoke the fear that only the FSB, which actually controls online voting, will have the key to the real election results. Members of the civic working group on REV point out that the draft law does not provide guarantees of oversight over online voting, even by members of relevant election commissions, and many provisions are ambiguously worded.
Lack of staff and resources
Another problem faced by the power elite and highlighted by the pending legislative initiatives is the obvious lack of managerial staff and resources to administer such a vast country like Russia.
First, the newly adopted law removes the two-term limit for governors. In other words, the infrequent but regular rotation of regional heads (once every ten years) is perceived by the Kremlin to be excessive, either because of staff shortages or because much depends on informalized, private arrangements and decisions. In any case, this situation only creates the illusion of sustainability and stability, although in reality it is more of a threat to them.
Second, according to the bill on local government being considered, the lower level of self-government (i.e. that of rural settlements and city districts) will, with the exception of Moscow and St Petersburg, be completely eliminated. This level accounts for over 90% of all elections and elected positions in the country. To all appearances, representatives of district administrations in large villages (most likely, not more than one seat per larger village and neighbouring small villages) and, perhaps, headmen in small settlements will replace heads of settlements and deputies of village councils. Given the similar number of district police officers (one person per several settlements), this means that there will be almost no official authority left at the level of rural settlements. It is likely that this gap will be filled by an unofficial power elite, ranging from the heads of businesses operating in the area to criminals.
Given the lack of financial and human resources to govern the country under the new complex conditions, the state is gradually withdrawing from the vast territory of the country. Initially, there were cuts in the number of schools and medical institutions, and now in local government. Huge territories lacking management are emerging in Russia that are disadvantaged and invisible to the state, lying apart from the ‘power vertical’. These areas include settlements outside cities and large villages (in fact, outside cities and district centres).
According to the 2010 All-Russian Census, there are 17 million people living in settlements with a population of fewer than 1,000 residents. Only in the regions of the Caucasus, Tyva and the Nenets Autonomous District does the average number of residents of rural settlements exceed 1,000 people; in the rest of Russia, the average is lower. It can confidently be assumed that the majority of residents of these territories are pensioners or people approaching retirement age. In addition, the average voting results for representatives of the authorities are generally higher here — this population is both the most conservative and the most state-dependent in the country.
But there is almost no money in rural areas, so people living there have turned out to be of no use to the authorities. The ‘power vertical’ will control only those units where there are financial flows. At the same time, the most financially burdensome areas will be taken over by higher tiers: the region takes over some of the local powers, and the federal level takes over regional ones. This is the ‘bad governance‘ siphoning off rent that Vladimir Gelman writes about in his similarly titled monograph.
It is also an indicator of the diminishing resources available to the authorities: despite the seeming further consolidation of the regime, the picture of a shrinking power space is emerging in Russia — if one understands power as the ability to govern and manoeuvre, that is, to coerce, control and choose from the options at hand. Foreign policy is increasingly drawing the power elite into confrontation without allies, while domestic policy is plagued by a lack of resources and social support. This is leading to the attempt to plug all the holes that might let fresh air into the political system.
Leaked documents reveal that this year’s governor re-election campaign in Irkutsk relied on systematic violations of electoral rules.
The scale and structure of the operation suggest that it is not an isolated case, but part of a coordinated model used across Russia’s gubernatorial elections.
On 12–14 September, Russia will hold regional elections. While these events can hardly be described as genuine elections, they remain one of the few available indicators of internal political dynamics.
In this digest, REM examines the changes to electoral legislation introduced ahead of the vote, as well as the results of candidate registration.
In spring 2025, Vladimir Putin signed a new law on local self-government.
The reform unexpectedly triggered backlash from regional leaders, deputies, and citizens — especially in Siberia and the Far East — that culminated in a mass rally in Gorno-Altaysk.
REM examines the evolution of local self-government in Russia and explores why seemingly formal administrative changes have sparked such resistance.
Ahead of 2026 parliamentary elections, Russian authorities are redrawing constituency boundaries.
It seems that after 25 years of undermining the electoral process, the Kremlin should not be concerned about the outcome, yet it is.
Redistricting is part of a broader strategy to manipulate elections, along with other tactics. This article explores how Kremlin has refined these tactics over the years and why they do not always succeed.
A new law on local self-government took effect in Russia, significantly altering the structure of local governance.
Originally designed to eliminate the two-tier system, the final version of the law made some concessions, but the end of local self-government as it was known seems inevitable.
Andrey Pertsev analyzes the reform’s early impact.
Russian “soft power” is a hot topic in both Russian and foreign media.
How effective actually is it? And what are the Kremlin’s fake publications up to in Germany?
Historian Ewgeniy Kasakow, author of the book "The Special Operation and Peace", analyzes the Kremlin’s main strategies and achievements in its fight for a German audience.
In February 2025, human rights organization OVD-Info published a report documenting key trends in political repression against anti-war activism in Russia.
The report sheds light on statistics of criminal and administrative cases related to anti-war activities over the last three years.
The Russian Ministry of Justice is increasingly labeling members of systemic parties as 'foreign agents' — targeting prominent regional politicians who lose their parliamentary mandates and the ability to participate in elections.
Andrey Pertsev explores how this will change the new composition of the State Duma and the party system.
The Mass Media Defense Centre, Russia's leading human rights organization for media and journalist rights, has released its annual "Freedom of Speech – 2024" report.
With detailed analysis of new laws and statistics on media persecution, the report sheds light on the growing threats to free speech and independent journalism across the country.
Kremlin is preparing a large-scale municipal reform, aiming to abolish tens of thousands of urban and rural settlements across Russia.
The initiative has faced criticism from the leadership of the affluent and populous republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, with State Duma Speaker Volodin effectively sabotaging its adoption.
This article explores why the Kremlin's municipal reform drew criticism from seemingly loyal regional politicians.
Electronic voting is poised to become Kremlin's key tool for securing desired outcomes in the 2026 State Duma elections.
This analysis explores how Kremlin and regional authorities are leveraging e-voting system for their gain ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Schools in Russia are not only educational institutions but also key players in the electoral process. Most polling stations are located at schools, while school staff make up the majority of election commission members.
To address the shortage of teachers in small towns and villages, Kremlin is now retraining 'war veterans' as educators.
The wealthiest political party in Russia, which has maintained a dominant position in power for over 20 years, receives annual funds large enough to cover the expenses of a small town.
Sirena project conducted a thorough analysis of the party’s financial report, identifying its key sources of support.
Vladimir Putin often refers to participants in the war as the "true elite".
However, the results of the regional elections show that the system is not ready to place 'frontline soldiers' in key positions, and the military itself is not keen to pursue deputy roles, which are often unpaid.
Due to repressions against the observers, reduced number of parties and remote e-voting system, the results of the September elections were contrary to the statutes of international law.
REM commissioned an independent team of analysts to monitor Russia's leading social networks, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Telegram and Youtube, to explore how the Kremlin's propaganda machine works on social media using actual data.
We present the main observations below, as well as visualized data and graphs illustrating the findings.
REM commissioned an independent team of analysts to monitor Russia's leading social networks, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Telegram and Youtube, to explore how the Kremlin's propaganda machine works on social media using actual data.
We present the main observations below, as well as visualized data and graphs illustrating the findings.
How has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affected the situation in the Kaliningrad region? What is the background and what should we expect in the upcoming regional elections?
Journalist and activist Roman Kolevatov answers these questions.
By-elections to the State Duma, elections to regional and local legislatures, as well as elections for heads of municipalities and local councils, will take place in the regions of Russia on 6-8 September 2024.
Observers prepared a final report on the results of candidate nominations and registrations.
Evgeny Stupin, deputy of the Moscow City Duma, was stripped of his deputy's mandate because of his anti-war stance. In this interview, he talks about his achievements and plans.
Why will the most unpopular governor of Saint Petersburg win the upcoming election? And how is Beglov significant to the Kremlin and to Putin personally?
Political observer Maksim Veselov discusses how “The Beglov Era” in St. Petersburg perfectly encapsulates today’s Russia and why Beglov serves as the role model of Putin’s clerk.
The movement in defense of voters' rights Golos has published an analytical report on the results of nomination and registration of gubernatorial candidates.
In his recently published book, Kynev described how regional politics has changed from the collapse of the USSR to the present day: how forces were distributed, how the power vertical was built, and how heads of regions turned into regular managers.
REM publishes a translation of 7x7 interview with him.
In June, Vladimir Putin appointed Andrey Turchak as the acting head of the Altai Republic, an economically depressive and sparsely populated region.
This appointment was seen as a "punishment" for Turchak's continued good relations with Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner private military company.
Meduza tells how Andrei Turchak is trying to please Altai residents and earn his return to Moscow.
In September 2024, Vladimir Putin’s hometown will elect its governor. Most likely, it will again be the Kremlin's protégé Alexander Beglov.
Presidential Administration's documents leaked to the journalists of “Vot tak” indicate that the entire campaign is managed from a single center, and Beglov’s rivals are carefully selected candidates with no chance of winning.
“Vot tak” reveals how Kremlin is running a fake campaign that costs 1.8 mln USD.
Vladimir Zhilkin is an anti-war candidate for the Moscow City Duma. He is a politician, human rights activist and sociologist from Tambov, a provincial city 500 km from Moscow.
REM publishes an abridged translation of Zhilkin's interview for 7x7, where he talks about his campaign, Muscovites' attitudes towards the war, and why it is important to run for election even when there are no free elections.
The Moscow parliament should be ‘maximally cleared’ of opposition candidates, with 'Sobyanin's people' taking their place. The election campaign should not attract unnecessary attention.
According to sources of the Verstka media, these are the objectives set by the Moscow mayor's office for the upcoming elections on 8 September.
Gleb Babich's campaign was one of the most remarkable campaigns in this year's Moscow City Duma elections.
On 16 July, Moscow Election Commission declared 8% of signatures collected by Gleb Babich invalid. The left-leaning urban activist will not be registered as a candidate.
In this interview, he talks about the goals and challenges of his campaign as well as the meaning of collective discussion and action in today’s Russia.
Recently the parliament of Georgia, despite widespread public unrest and warnings from the EU, passed a law on 'foreign agents', commonly referred to as 'the Russian law'.
In this article, REM discusses the evolution of the legislation on foreign agents in Russia and the recent legislative amendments on the participation of 'foreign agents' in elections.
The Anti-Corruption Foundation’s latest documentary series with the heavy title Traitors raises complex questions about the 1990s as a myth and as an actual historical period that had consequences for the present - questions about opposition strategy, communication style, political platform and Russia’s possible future.
In this essay, Dr. Ilya Matveev reflects on each of these questions in turn.
The results of presidential campaign 2024 raise questions about the future of the party system.
For the first time in the post-Soviet history of Russia, none of the parliamentary candidates gained more than 5% of the vote - at least according to the official data.
This means the party machinery for mobilizing core supporters is virtually inoperative.
As Putin enters his fifth term, what transformations is Russian party system going through? An analysis by Riddle.
Although the 47-year-old Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov denies rumors about his potentially fatal illness, media and experts on Russian elites claim that Kremlin has begun to develop a plan for power transfer.
What kind of person does Kremlin need to be in charge of Chechnya, and who are potential candidates for this post – in REM's review.
United Russia tries hard to nominate war veterans for regional parliaments, the party system continues to decline, while Chechnya acknowledges the use of coercion to vote in the last presidential elections.
More about the election-related developments of March/April 2024 in this review.
In the first three months of 2024, Russian authorities declared more organizations “undesirable” than in the full year of 2022.
The law on undesirable organizations was adopted in 2015. Foreign NGOs labeled “undesirable” are banned from establishing legal entities, disseminating information and implementing programs in Russia.
This long read examines how the legislation on undesirable organizations has evolved since then and how the law is enforced today.
The current state of opposition politics in Russia is paradoxical. Despite commanding considerable resources, the opposition has not had any strategic or even tactical successes for a long time.
In this essay, a political scientist discusses the impasse in which the Russian opposition finds itself and outlines three areas for strategic discussion about its future.
REM commissioned an independent team of analysts to monitor Russia's leading social networks, VKontakte and Telegram, to show how the Kremlin's propaganda machine works on social media.
Here are the results of social media monitoring during the voting days on March 16-18, 2024.
We collected evidence demonstrating why the presidential vote 2024 in Cyprus can be considered the largest overseas electoral fraud in Russia's modern history.
Various methods of data analysis can be used to detect electoral fraud.
Several investigative teams counted that at least 22 million votes — a third of the 65 million ballots cast for Vladimir Putin — were cast fraudulently. Keep reading to find out how it works.
Based on the Golos report, REM summarizes key trends observed during the second and the beginning of the third voting days of the presidential election 2024.
REM commissioned an independent team of analysts to monitor Russia's leading social networks, VKontakte and Telegram, to show how the Kremlin's propaganda machine works on social media.
Here we present the main findings, fascinating data, and diagrams revealing the mechanisms behind this massive propaganda machine.
In regimes such as Russia's, a typical voter lacks motivation to participate in the elections due to the high predictability of the outcome.
At the same time, election organizers need to ensure a high turnout to show that the society is not tired of its national leader even after decades of his rule.
After the CEC refused to register Ekaterina Duntsova and Boris Nadezhdin, it became clear - in presidential election 2024, there will be no one on the ballot who opposes the war in Ukraine and criticizes the government.
Nevertheless, prominent opposition leaders continue to agitate Russians to go to the polls and vote for "anyone but Putin". The most obvious choice for many is Vladislav Davankov, a presidential candidate from the New People party.
Reflecting on Alexei Navalny's political journey, this text recognizes his substantial impact on Russian elections - for both the past and probably the future.
Navalny played a crucial part in enlightening Russian society about elections through his campaigns, emerging as a symbol of will and hope for the most thoughtful segment of the population.
His legacy leaves an enduring mark on the landscape of Russian politics, which will not disappear with his murder.
Golos, the Movement in defense of voters' rights, has published a report summing up the results of candidates' nomination and registration during the Russian presidential election campaign 2024.
Boris Nadezhdin, an anti-war candidate for the Russian presidency, was not registered as such by the Russian Central Election Commission.
Being nominee of a non-parliamentary party, he needed to submit 105.000 signatures of Russian citizens in support of his candidacy. He did so, but the CEC invalidated a signification part of them.
We explain how Russian election commissions use the signatures as a tool to eliminate undesirable candidates.
Many are convinced that Nadezhdin's nomination is a well thought out plan orchestrated by the presidential administration. Even his surname has roots in the word "hope" in Russian.
Yet, these rumors have not prevented Nadezhdin from gaining almost unanimous support of Russian opposition and eventually becoming the only presidential hopeful with anti-war agenda.
On January 14, representatives of Russian exiled opposition participated in a live broadcast on TV Rain to discuss their strategy for the upcoming elections in March 2024.
REM publishes a short summary of participants’ suggestions.
Russian CEC adopted regulations for candidates to run for the presidency. Predictably, not all applicants were able to obtain the status of a registered candidate. Meanwhile, the election campaign of incumbent President Vladimir Putin started with violations of electoral legislation.
In this review, we briefly recap the most significant events of late 2023 and early 2024.
After 600 days of genocidal war in Ukraine, dozens of women - mothers, wives and sisters - attempted to rally demanding the return of their loved ones home.
Any manifestation of dissent is an unlikely event these days in Russia due to the highly repressive environment and immediate crackdown on any instance of public discontent.
In this report, we recount the most significant November 2023 developments related to the presidential elections 2024.
Among them are Putin's presidential bid, test of e-voting, amendments to legislation on presidential elections and political “cleansings” in Russian regions.
The report is based on a regular news digest by the Golos Movement for Defense of Voters' Rights.
“Every day the life of ordinary Russians is becoming more difficult. Citizens cannot freely express their opinion if it does not coincide with the position of the authorities; the number of political prisoners is growing, hundreds of thousands of people have been forced out of the country. <...>
“Military operations” on the territory of neighboring states lead to imminent isolation and degradation”, her campaign website says.
The election on 17 March 2024 will be the first presidential election during the war in recent Russian history. Further, it will be the first presidential election after the constitutional amendments 2020 that nullified the count of consecutive presidential terms and allowed Vladimir Putin to stay in power until 2036.
We asked an expert if there is anyroom for maneuver for opposition voters, given the unprecedented level of political constraints.
In March 2024 election, Vladimir Putin should receive at least 80% of the votes with a turnout of 80%. According to “Verstka”, these are the benchmarks that the Kremlin's domestic policy bloc is setting for the Russian authorities.
The campaign slogan consists of three words: “Pride. Hope. Confidence”. The heroes of the “Special Military Operation” will also be invited to become Putin's confidants; however, the main focus won’t be set on them or on the war itself.
How to organize a fair voting system in post-Putin Russia? How elections should be arranged and who should be responsible for this? What principles of representation should be taken into account?
Political scientist Grigory Golosov discusses these and other questions in this article.
On 25 September, supporters of Alexei Navalny published a large text in which he rejected a coalition with the rest of the opposition. On the same day, Maxim Katz released a video where he disagreed with Navalny and called on “dissenters” to unite before the presidential elections in 2024.
In this article, political scientist Grigory Golosov explains which of the two strategies is more effective, and whether political coalitions in modern Russia make any sense at all.
The demand for free elections should be an indisputable cornerstone of any democratic reform program. That is why it is a common belief that the first order of business after the fall of the current regime in Russia should be to conduct free nationwide elections.
Political scientist Grigory Golosov argues that despite the importance of elections, this issue should not be the first on the agenda and explains why.
Over the span of several election cycles, e-voting in Russia has proved to be a black box serving the regime’s needs.
After its launch in just a handful of regions, it is now expected to become available to all Russians in the 2024 presidential elections to facilitate fraud and deliver an overwhelming vote share for Vladimir Putin.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, most deputies who openly disagreed with Putin's war were sent to pre-trial detention centers or 'squeezed out' of the country.
However, despite the total suppression of the freedom of speech and assembly, there are still municipal politicians in Russia who openly oppose the war and win local elections.
On 8-10 September 2023, Russia held local elections in two dozen different regions. The Kremlin could have easily canceled them by declaring martial law. Instead, elections were held in the newly occupied areas of Ukraine despite martial law. This suggests that Putin’s regime still finds sham elections useful.
This essay provides a brief history of elections in post-Soviet Russia, exploring the latest example of the Kremlin’s sham democracy and sketches the prospects of political changes.
Do observers in Russia possess the tools to maintain independent oversight of elections? How has the war influenced the pre-election campaign? Can the recent vote even be described as an election? What is the Russian government's motive for holding such “elections”, and what might we anticipate from the 2024 presidential campaign?
8-10 September in Russia were days of elections of State Duma deputies in four districts, heads of 21 regions, deputies of 16 regional parliaments, 12 city councils of regional capitals, as well as elections in the occupied territories and numerous local elections.
REM summarizes the main conclusions from the observation.
The electoral and civil rights legislation in Russia is getting stricter year by year, leaving very little room for oppositional politics. What can opponents of the regime achieve in the face of constantly introduced obstacles?
In this article, we reflect on whether there is any room left for opposition politicians in Russia, and if it makes sense for them to participate in elections at all.
Do elections have any value in a country with strong repressive machinery where any politician whom the authorities may consider dangerous can be placed in jail?
The author of this article is convinced that elections in Russia present not only a high-cost ritual spectacle simulating democracy but also largely shape the interaction between the state and society.
Parties are reluctant to participate in elections to regional and municipal assemblies, an expert report concludes. They understand the impossibility of fair competition and do not want to invest effort in fighting the ruling party. Further, the elections in the occupied territories cannot be considered legitimate either legally or procedurally.
Read more about the results of the nomination of candidates for deputies of local and regional parliaments.
The report’s primary conclusion aligns with expert forecasts: genuine competition between candidates is anticipated in only one region, the Republic of Khakassia, out of the 21 regions that participate in the September elections.
Read this report summary for more statistics and expert insights.
This article delves into the process of elimination of municipal autonomy from the 2010s to the present, leading us through a series of reforms that have helped Kremlin build the so-called ‘power vertical’.
A gradual transition from weak, but somewhat independent local governance toward loyal local appointees contributes to our understanding of how political decision-making works in high-capacity authoritarian states like Russia.
This year, Khakassia emerged as the sole Russian region where its governor, communist Valentin Konovalov, invited his adversary, Sergey Sokol from United Russia, to a debate. While the audience hoped for a substantive political exchange, the discourse was dominated by accusations of mudslinging and chasing hype.
This article explores how debates in modern Russia have changed, why gubernatorial candidates avoid open discussions with opponents, and what the future holds for debates.
In the past, parties and candidates would offer distinct promises to voters, address social concerns, and even position themselves against the government. However, the current campaigns appear lackluster and devoid of a clear message. Even the topic of war is scarcely touched upon by the primary candidates.
This REM review explores why the war in Ukraine hasn't emerged as the predominant topic of the recent election campaign.
A recently published "Golos" report details who holds control over the precinct electoral commissions across Russian regions. REM provides insights into the key findings of the report, emphasizing its significance as we approach the 2023 elections and the 2024 presidential elections.
On the eve of the elections, Russian authorities adopted a new package of amendments to the electoral legislation. The changes aim to help candidates from the ruling party win in the September elections.
Wagner's rebellion showed how weak President Putin's support base is. However, no real political changes followed. Are they even possible in modern Russia, and could elections - an instrument specially invented by the democratic world for this purpose - contribute to the changes?
News on Just Russia's withdrawal of electoral activity in the regions began to emerge shortly after Prigozhin's uprising in June 2023. Expert opinions differ: some believe it signals the falling from favor for the systemic opposition, while others argue that the party uses the uprising as a rhetorical cover-up for the internal splits.
In light of the gubernatorial elections to be held in September in 21 Russian regions, we analyze a report on the candidates running for governor. The report concludes that no real competition can be expected in these elections, with few exceptions.
Prigozhin's failed mutiny on June 24th sparked various speculations concerning his support among the Russian population.
In times of political turbulence, approval ratings become subject to interpretations fueled by the hope of regime collapse. An expert explains why putting so much trust in politicians’ approval ratings originating from today’s Russia might be delusional.
All the proclamations about the active involvement of 'war veterans' in politics remain empty rhetoric.
In reality, the 'defenders of Donbass' hat is now worn by the same politicians who have held official positions for years. This verbiage and masquerade are designed not to please the voters but to satisfy one particular person.
As it turned out at legal proceedings held on the 9th of March, proving the illegality and inadequacy of the online voting system used in Moscow's elections in 2022 wasn't rocket science or high mathematics. On the contrary, it was as easy as asking for a certificate!
Moscow's i-voting system is not lawfully certified and contradicts legal requirements, court investigations revealed.
Again and again, the Duma adjusts electoral legislation to suit its current needs. This time the main innovation appears to be a "remote election" regime for the occupied territories. This squaring of the circle would allow martial law to stay and elections to be held concurrently.
For years, Moscow has been a hard place to win for pro-governmental candidates. Even online voting was hardly enough to secure trouble-free victories because the citizens used the traditional method. For the mayoral campaign of 2023, a new device is invented. 40% of precinct polling stations will evaporate into the Cloud.
The new marketing plan for selling Putin to the voter is being developed at the Kremlin in secretive "closed seminars". The new packaging for the quarter-century-old merchandise is being tested. But the campaign's outcome will be decided on the battlefields, not, for the first time in this century, in the Kremlin's cabinets.
It's hard to believe that Russian elections, nowadays a synonym of rigging, falsifications and coercion, were almost honest before this man entered the post of the chief electoral officer. Last week, Churov, also known as the Wizard, passed away, but his malevolent curses will haunt Russian elections for years.
Last year the Kremlin cheated people who came to pollings station. The regime said nothing about the upcoming draft. But merely within 10 days after the polling stations were closed, the recruiting centres were unexpectedly open.
The Communist Party prepared their Electoral Code for consideration by the Duma. They urge to make the third Sunday in March the primary voting day, eliminate multi-day and distant electronic voting, abolish voting in streets, etc. Arkady Lyubarev, an electoral expert, shares the secret: Why the Duma will not enact any Code, even an immaculate one.
Ordinary non-public citizens of Russia become threat number two once they acquire knowledge related to the electoral field and touch the sphere where one of the fundamental myths of the regime is created: the myth of nationwide popular support.
A new study of Russian social media proved half of the sabre-rattling messages to be artificial duplicates orchestrated from the single centre. The research has also revealed prolific pro-governmental professional bloggers trying to dominate the Russian Internet community. And yet, they are 1.5 less popular than anti-war authors.
The distant electronic voting keeps pushing the limits of our imagination. After the actual process of voting, where the entire process took place outside the view of key participants, came the legal revelation of how the lawmakers preemptively absolved themselves and the Central Election Commission of any responsibility.
Over 10 years, EPDE has evolved into a professional network of 16 members from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Ukraine. EPDE is united in the common goal of improving democratic election processes across Europe and providing a platform for peer learning and professionalisation for its members and experts.
The Russian people have not named Vladimir Putin Il Duce (‘The Leader’). He has been identified as such, just as earlier in history in Italy, by the elite. And as in Italy, the elimination of fascism can only be finalised by integrating the ex-fascist country into the Western world.
The United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights defenders and on the right to freedom and peaceful assembly and of associations issued a statement on 27 October 2022 explicitly recognising citizen and international election observers as human rights defenders.
By going to war in Ukraine, the Putin regime tried to be what it pretended to be, but its facade crashed into reality. Any myth is effective as long as its creator does not allow it to clash with reality. Skilled myth-makers know this well and guard their creations, and they do not, of course, believe in their own myths. Putin observed these rules for a long time, but he gradually began to believe in the myths that he and his entourage created and then acted in accordance with them.
We continue to acquaint our readers with those rare, brave individuals who challenged the Putin regime at home during elections in September 2022, when the regime began to receive the first sobering blows at the front in Ukraine.
What happened with the reckless candidates after the elections? How did they survive the ordeal? Who managed to stay, and who had to flee the country? You will learn it in the following, the final part of this coverage, which is currently being written exclusively for REM.
Today we will discuss budgetary workers and their role in Putin's regime. Who are the "budgetniki"? Are they the backbone of Putin's regime? In what countries and under what conditions are elections susceptible to manipulation through budgetary workers?
On 12 September 2022, President Zelensky announced the liberation of 6,000 km2 in a massive counter-offensive. For President Putin, the day was the beginning of a period of humiliating defeats, of the disgraceful retreat of his army and a chaotic attempt at mobilisation.
But up to this very day, there had been an election campaign in Russia. In the choking atmosphere of "special military operation", under censorship and repression for any word of dissent, there were amazing people who dared to challenge the System.
The election outcomes were achieved in unfree, unequal election campaigns, in an environment of restrictions on the right to be elected for a substantial number of citizens and on fundamental political rights. Under such conditions, it is impossible to establish the actual will of the voters.
By the end of voting, tension at the polling stations was growing. The number of reports claiming that commission members, police and unauthorised persons put psychological pressure on observers has also increased.
According to Golos Movement, the main trends for the second voting day were conflicts between members of commissions and civic observers, signs of possible falsifications, and bribery and coercion of voters.
Main election day trends: pressure on election observers and candidates, bloated turnout in Distance E-Voting, coerced voting, failure of the Electronic Voter Register, violation of the rights of election committee members, observers and mass media, fabrication of fakes and attempts to discredit citizen observers.
Without the successes in Ukraine or on the propagandistic internal front, these elections are the last opportunity for the Kremlin to assert the concept of business-as-usual, to ensure the grip on regional assemblies. It is vital in the anticipation of an economic slump, Moreover, the new municipal structure needs a strong hand. Finally, it is a testing ground for “distant voting”, impermeable for observers.
This investigation is both a quantum leap in electoral observation and the most severe blow to the ruling party's reputation. As you’ll see, the findings even question who is the genuine ruling party in Russia. It was such a severe blow that Ms Pamfiliva, the chairwoman of the Russian Central Election Commission, personally reported the case to President Putin within a week of the publication.
The failure of the PR campaign uncanny resembles the collapse of the military campaign on the battlefields. A new media monitoring report on "special operation" describes the unexpected resistance of the Russian population to a heavy propagandistic barrage.
EPDE calls on all national and regional Parliaments of the EU, the European Parliament, the PACE and the OSCE (OSCEPA) to undertake measures preventing their members from participating in illegitimate “election observation”, organized to whitewash illegal electoral processes.
The upcoming E-day in Russia: deprived of the freedom of speech and party lists, elections are still the only way to grasp the citizens' attitude towards authorities.
Essential changes to Russia’s electoral legislation were introduced after its aggression against Ukraine. Indeed, one might discern some military flavour in these adjustments: discipline, unification, centralisation, monopolisation of chain of command, and elimination of tools of civil control. Dr Arkady Lyubarev, candidate of legal sciences, co-author of federal and Moscow electoral legislation, and editor in chief of the draft Electoral Code, gives his assessment of the further deterioration of the electoral system in Russia.
This story is quite exceptional. We’ve never heard the testimony of electoral fraud from a witness of such high administrative rank and political status: the former vice-mayor of a millionaire city, a former head of administration of a district, a member of the regional Political Council of the United Russia Party, ruling political organisation in the country, the Secretary of the district Political Council of the party and finally, a former KGB and FSB officer. Quite an informant!
The invaders have not been consistent in governing the temporarily occupied territories. L/DPR militants ‘appoint’ nonames to nonexistent offices in some places. In others, there are talks of holding a pseudo-referendum, and PR campaigns are run elsewhere to an incorporation in the occupied Crimea. The ‘people’s republic’ format will not work this time. However, it is still worth preparing for a negative scenario.
A. Kynev: All these hand-wringing and pathetic calls to each end everybody to repent is the utter public suicide of the opposition and a priceless gift to the government. No one has ever come to power or won an election on the pretext of humbling themselves and repenting. Therefore, this approach is an absolute dead-end and insane endeavour, at least from the electoral point of view.
The Russian authorities keep emasculating the institution of elections and modelling it after the Belarusian version. Notably, these changes do not match too well with the allegedly increased popular support for the Russian authorities against the backdrop of the war. Instead, it demonstrates a lack of confidence that the autumn elections will go smoothly.
Since September 2021, twenty regional coordinators and experts of the 'Golos' Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights were added to the registry of foreign media outlets performing the functions of 'a foreign agent'. Here's an overview of how election observers are being targeted and persecuted.
The 'League of Voters' Foundation appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for an interim measure requiring the Russian authorities not to liquidate it pending the ECHR proceedings on its earlier complaint. Should the liquidation proceed, it would make all future legal activities of the Foundation impossible: the organization would be unable to rent office space, collect donations, will lose all of its property, and would be forced to cease its human rights and educational activities.
On September 11, 2022, municipal elections will be held in 125 of Moscow's 146 districts. It is not yet known whether these elections will be a multi-day process, but it is already certain that online voting will be used again and that parties that are preparing for the elections are already facing candidate shortages. Yekaterina Grobman reviews the current situation and what we can expect in 2022.
Independent election experts have described the 2021 Duma elections as the dirtiest elections in Russia's history. The lack of public control, the deprivation of millions of Russian citizens of their passive suffrage, massive manipulation of results through e-voting, holding of elections on the annexed territory of Crimea, and the inclusion of voters from the occupied Eastern Ukraine put the legitimacy of the current State Duma and the new PACE delegation under question.
The passing year built on legislative trends of the previous one and even brought about many innovations in censorship, limitations of online activities, and infringements on privacy. Such provisions include multiple prohibitions related to the Great Patriotic War, the ‘law against Anti-Corruption Foundation’, and infamous QR codes.
On 28 December 2021 Russia's Supreme Court ruled to close International Memorial. The lawsuit, filed by the Prosecutor General's Office, referred to a missing 'foreign agent' designation on some of the materials produced by International Memorial. This is only a formal pretext, though, and the court hearings showed that these allegations were groundless.
Hardly any of Navalny's key allies currently remain in Russia. The Insider interviewed former coordinators of Navalny's regional headquarters to find out why and how they left, what they do in exile, and under what conditions they are willing to return to Russia.
On December 8, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow ruled to liquidate the 'League of Voters' Foundation. Its leaders believe that the ruling is politically motivated and is aimed to destroy the organization which is a partner in the 'Golos' Movement and supports the training of independent citizen election observers in Russia.
A member of the 'Golos' Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights recounts their experience observing elections on behalf of the Moscow Civic Chamber. According to the activist, the institution appears to purposefully instruct observers in such a manner as to limit their ability to make a real difference at the polling stations.
Last year United Russia collected a record amount of donations from legal entities, 4.8 billion rubles. The Insider learned that the party received about half of this money from major Russian Railways contractors, some of which seemingly could not afford to make such "donations". Despite claiming to channel funds towards charity and fighting the Coronavirus, the party spent it on the maintenance of its apparatus and election campaigning.
Russian authorities have moved to liquidate the International Historical Educational Charitable and Human Rights Society 'Memorial' and its affiliate, Russian Human Rights Centre 'Memorial'. The 'Golos' Movement calls for solidarity with Russia's longest-standing human rights organization.
The political bloc of the Moscow Mayor's office has begun campaign preparations for the 2022 municipal elections. Meduza breaks down the key points in the preliminary campaign plan here.
Following the observation of the September 19, 2021 elections, the 'Golos' Movement stated that 'the current electronic voting system does not meet the high standards of public accountability of electoral procedures', which the Russian Constitution and legislation establish as mandatory. Despite this position, some promoters of online voting in Russia have been claiming otherwise.
Preliminarily evaluating the elections to the Ufa City Council and the State Duma in the Republic of Bashkortostan, the 'Golos' Movement regretfully cannot recognize the elections as truly fair, i.e., fully compliant with the Constitution, the laws of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Republic of Bashkortostan, and international election standards.
According to the analysis by Sergey Shpilkin, 889 thousand out of 1.7 million votes for United Russia in Kuban do not fall into the normal mathematical distribution. This can result from direct falsifications, pressurized voting of the employees of state-owned enterprises, public institutions, and local authorities, and the use of an administrative resource.
The Communist Party received 19% of the votes in the last elections to the State Duma. After that, the party's supporters faced unprecedented pressure for the 'systemic opposition.' They were detained, fined, sentenced to administrative arrests, and blocked in the party premises. CPRF continues to challenge the election results and demand an investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
On Tuesday, October 12, the new convocation of Russia's State Duma convened for its first session. Roughly a fifth of all lawmakers — 88 of 450 deputies — received their seats from higher-ranked candidates on party lists, winning the jobs because others didn't want them.
In total, from the beginning of voting dated September 17, 'Map of Violations' by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' published 4592 reports. The Map is a project that collects information about possible electoral violations using the principle of crowdsourcing – observers, voters, members of commissions may report alleged violations witnessed during the electoral campaigning or voting using a submission form on the website or a telephone hotline.
The "remote electronic voting" or online voting held in the Russian capital during the September 17-19, 2021 elections was scandalous, to say the least. In response, two groups have been formed by the Russian public to scrutinize the results.
In order to help assess the outcomes of 2021 State Duma elections, the 'Movement in the Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' provides a reference analysis, dividing Russian regions into six groups based on the level of falsifications in the federal elections of 2016 and 2018 and in the all-Russian voting in 2020.
Sergey Shpilkin analyzes data from 96,840 polling stations that cover 107.9 million registered voters out of 109.2 million on the list. His analysis demonstrates that at the polling stations where the results appear genuine, the turnout is on average 38% and the United Russia's share of votes is between 31% and 33%.
This is a preliminary statement on findings of observation on the main voting day, September 19, 2021, by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos".' Golos ran long-term and short-term observation of all stages of the campaign. In the course of the elections, the united call center's hotline received 5,943 calls. The 'Map of Violations' received 4,973 reports of alleged violations by noon 20 September, Moscow time, including 3,787 on the voting days.
This is a brief overview of election monitoring findings on the Second Voting Day, September 18, 2021 by citizen observers of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"'.
This is a brief overview of election monitoring findings on the First Voting Day by citizen observers of the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"'.
The September 19, 2021 elections are marked by growing pressure on media and individual journalists, attempts at blocking information about "Smart Voting", and massive coercion of voters to vote and register for e-voting and mobile voting. In parallel, social media has been growing in importance for years as a space of more freedom and an alternative information channel. Here are the main findings of the report that focuses on the impact of these two antipodal trends.
This report covers the monitoring of social networks from the 10th to the 11th week of the election campaign (August 23 to September 5) to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for September 19, 2021.
One aspect of the 2021 Russian parliamentary elections that differentiates them from previous federal elections is the potential participation in the voting process of dozens of thousands of people located on the Ukrainian territories outside of control of the Ukrainian authorities and not recognized as part of Russia by the Russian Federation itself.
This is the seventh overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the 'Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos"' between September 6 and September 12. Since the beginning of the election campaign, 945 messages from 72 regions have been published on the Map.
This is the sixth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 30 and September 5. In total, from August 30 to September 1, 125 messages have been received by the Map.
This report covers the monitoring of social networks from the 5th to the 9th week (July 20 - August 22) of the election campaign to the Russian State Duma, scheduled for September 19, 2021.
Despite its dismal approval rating, Russian President Vladimir Putin's ruling political party can – and likely will – win a constitutional majority in September's legislative elections.
This is the fifth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 23 and August 29. In total, 100 messages have been received by the Map during this period.
The Moscow City Court has designated the Anti-Corruption Foundation, Alexey Navalny's Headquarters and the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation as 'extremist' organizations. Inter alia, it implies the prohibition to participate in elections.
The authorities have proceeded to banning pro-opposition candidates from running to the State Duma and other legislative bodies on a pretext of involvement in Navalny's projects.
The elections of the State Duma of Russia of the eighth convocation are marked by considerable tightening of rules for candidate nomination and registration. In fact, the rules are much worse than in 2016, when the current membership of the parliament was elected. Run on the background of harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and information and freedom of assembly and association, the elections are accompanied by a political crackdown against the most active pro-opposition citizens.
This is the fourth overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 16 and August 22. In total, 98 messages have been received by the Map in that period.
Equality of rights of candidates in media coverage of their election campaign is one of the most important conditions for holding free and democratic elections. For a significant part of Russians, television remains to be one of the main sources of information. During the election campaign, the influence of television in shaping the attitude of the majority of voters towards elections and candidates is often decisive. Here is a summary of monitoring findings for the five main federal television channels during the first eight weeks of the campaign.
This is the third overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 9 and August 15. Since the beginning of the election campaign, 452 messages from 62 regions have been published on the Map.
On August 18, the Ministry of Justice of Russia included the Movement 'Golos' as the first unregistered organisation into the registry of unregistered public associations performing the functions of a foreign agent. Here is the translation of their statement.
According to the CEC data as of 9 July 2021, 4,370 elections and referenda are scheduled for 19 September 2021, including elections to the State Duma, nine gubernatorial elections (new heads will be elected in three more regions), 39 elections to regional parliaments, and 11 elections of representative bodies of regional centres. Here's an overview of legal regulations and peculiarities of these races.
In 2021, the Russian Central Election Commission decided to scrap open video broadcasts from the polling stations – a feature of Russian elections since 2012. The Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' has appealed to the President to help overturn this decision.
This is the second overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between August 2 and August 8.
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly will not deploy international election observation missions to the 2021 State Duma elections due to major limitations imposed on the institutions. Announcing the decision, ODIHR Director noted that the ability "to independently determine the number of observers necessary for us to observe effectively and credibly is essential to all international observation."
On 28 July 2021, the Central Election Commission adopted a new media accreditation procedure that restricts media access to observe and report on the electoral process. The new rules violate the freedom of media editorial policy and may significantly reduce the transparency of the election process.
This is the first overview of reports of possible violations of electoral legislation gathered via the 'Map of Violations' by the Movement for the Defense of Voters' Rights 'Golos' between June 22 and August 1.
Less than two months before the elections, the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) decided to scrap open video broadcasts from the polling stations, which have been the feature of Russian elections since 2012.
Since the last State Duma elections in 2016, lawmakers have introduced 19 amendments to the election law. In the year leading up to the State Duma elections in September 2021 alone, seven significant legislative amendments have been introduced, six of them in less than four months before the start of the campaign.
After almost a decade of crackdowns on big players, the landscape of critical journalism in Russia is dominated by local or smaller niche projects. But if the 2020-2021 trend of relentless attacks on media, journalists, and bloggers continues, many of these small projects are not likely to survive into the autumn. The regime makes it pretty clear that it no longer intends to tolerate any dissent.
The laws on "foreign agent" and "undesirable organizations" continue to hamper the work of affected organizations, stigmatize and damage their reputation, and isolate the civil society from international cooperation and support. What are these provisions and how are they being applied?
The Russian State Duma's seventh convocation is coming to the end of its five-year term. And according to a new report from iStories and Znak.com, dozens of its deputies haven't said a word in a parliamentary session since they were elected in 2016. Others haven't put forward a single bill. Be that as it may, this hasn't stopped these lawmakers from collecting high salaries and planning to put their names on the ballot for the State Duma election coming up in September.
According to election observers, recent amendments further limiting citizens' passive suffrage constitute a "fifth wave" of depriving Russians of their right to stand for election since the collapse of the USSR. New restrictions have a particular impact on politically active citizens.
In May, the Russian Federation has tested a new system of remote electronic voting. The Movement in Defense of Voters' Rights "Golos" observed the testing phase, took part in the voting, and shared their conclusions and recommendations in a respective report.
Opportunities for independent citizen election observation and civil society space in general have been shrinking steadily in Russia over the past decade. Recently, further restrictions have been adopted that limit the ability of citizens to independently monitor electoral processes.
Over the past 14 years, the authorities have blocked 120,000 candidates from participating in elections of various levels, depriving millions of Russian citizens of the right to choose their representatives.
Russia has finally outlawed Alexey Navalny's political and anti-corruption movement. Here's how the crackdown affects activists, journalists, and ordinary supporters.
The President of Russia approved the law prohibiting those who are "involved" in the activities of an extremist organization from running in elections.
On June 9, the Moscow City Court, based on the charges by the Moscow Prosecutor's Office, recognized the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), the Foundation for the Protection of Citizens' Rights, and the headquarters of Alexei Navalny as extremist organizations. Now, many citizens are under a threat of pressure and persecution.
Between 2003 and 2018, OSCE/ODIHR published 139 recommendations on how to improve the conduct of elections in Russia. In the run-up to the State Duma elections in 2021, Russia has fully implemented just over 10% of them. Some have been tackled more promptly than others.
Ahead of the State Duma election on September 19, 2021, Russia just tested its remote electronic voting system. While the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (CEC) is preparing the report about the results of the test, election monitors say Russia's electronic voting system is a black box.
The Russian authorities are expected to orchestrate a result in the upcoming State Duma elections that will give United Russia a clear majority of seats. This does not mean, however, that the manipulation of the electoral process by the authorities is complete. In a limited number of competitive districts, true opposition candidates including candidates who are associated with Aleksei Navalny have a real chance of winning if they are allowed to run. In recent weeks, steps have been taken to block these 'undesirable' candidates from participating.
On March 19, 2021, the new composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Russian Federation was revealed. Out of 15 members, eight new people joined the CEC. In particular, the new Commission has been 'reinforced' by bureaucrats from the Presidential Administration, the State Duma, and the Civic Chamber (a consultative civil society institution closely linked to the government).
Honorary pension for Ukrainian elites
For years, the Kremlin has sought to incorporate Ukrainian politicians, security officials and bureaucrats loyal to it into its power structure.
However, after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the full-scale invasion, its policy underwent significant changes.
In this essay, Andrey Pertsev analyzes the Kremlin's new strategy to win over Ukrainian officials dissatisfied with the Ukrainian leadership.
Read more … Honorary pension for Ukrainian elites